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SLUMLORDISM AS A TORT
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[The cartoon is copyrighted by the Washington Post Co., 1949-from THE
(Beacon Press 1952), reprinted with permission.]

!IERBLOCK

BOOK

The case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment ... and lead
him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"t

Introduction

ry-,im war against poverty has been fought with rather more vigor

.1. than its initiators contemplated. Thus far, however, the major
engagements have taken place in the streets of Watts and Chicago,
which is not quite what they had in mind. Some, who think it odd
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1957, Harvard College;

J.D. 1959, University of Chicago.-Ed.
• • B.A. 1965, Whittier College; Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California
at Berkeley.-Ed.
t R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 46, comment d at 78 (1965).
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that as we pass more laws we get more lawlessness,1 will perhaps content themselves by observing that the feeding hand is always bitten.
Those less easily satisfied have begun to see the need for adopting
some legal solutions as far reaching as the problems they are designed
to abate; the following article is addressed to them.
As an issue which is illustrative both of enormous need, and of
great expenditure of traditional legal technology directed toward
mitigating that need, perhaps nothing surpasses the problem of slum
housing. Today, half a century after slum dwelling laws were widely
enacted in response to public outrage,2 and a generation since the
principle of public housing became operative,3 there remain vast
numbers of urban housing units in which the most appalling living
conditions continued to exist. 4 Yet, it would be difficult to find a
social wrong that has been more thoroughly and elaborately attacked
in law. For example, New York, the first city of America in the
quantity and detestability of its slum dwellings, as well as in other
things, has at least five major legal devices designed to eliminate
substandard housing: The owners of such housing can be criminally
prosecuted; 5 the offending building can be ordered vacated; 6 rent
can in some circumstances be withheld or abated; 7 controlled rents
can be involuntarily reduced; 8 and the building can even be put into
1. It has been widely observed that opportunity triggers increasing expectations,
so that times of social progress are pre-eminently times of social unrest, with the level
of dissatisfactions tending to outrun the rate of progress. E.g., 1 STOUFFER, THE AMER.I·
CAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE 153, 257 (1949); Grimshaw, Lawlessness
and Violence in America and Their Special Manifestations in Changing Negro-White
Relationships, 44 J. NEGRO HIST. 52 (1959); Reston, The Shame of the Cities, N.Y.
Times, July 24, 1966, p. !OE, col. 5. This recognition prompts, rather than pre-empts,
the lawyer's task, for his role is to prevent the disorder which that gap engenders
by providing legal forums into which new and legitimate demands may be
channeled.
2. See WENDT, HOUSING POLICY-THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 145 (1962); Comment,
Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv.
304, 315 (1965).
3. The federally aided public-housing program began with the Housing Act of
1937, 50 Stat. 888.
4. The 1960 Census of Housing shows over 15 million deficient housing units,
out of a total inventory of some 58 million units, of which over 6 million are either
dilapidated or deteriorating and lacking plumbing facilities. U.S. CENSUS OF HOUSING
1960, vol. 1, States and Small Areas, Part 1 xxxvr. A committee of the Illinois General
Assembly, after touring slum housing in 1965, reported: "It is hardly possible to
believe that human beings live in a modem city in the conditions which the Com•
mittee observed.'' REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRE·
SENTATIVES ON SLUM HousING AND RENT GOUGING 4 Oune 1, 1965). See also the remarks
of Vice President Humphrey, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1966, p. 1, col. 2.
5. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw § 304; N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2040.
6. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw § 309.
7. N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAw § 143 (b); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAw § 302-a; N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTIONS LAW §§ 755, 776(b).
8. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS tit. 23, app. § 34 (2) (McKinney 1961); N.Y.C. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § Y-51-5.0 (h) (1963).
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receivership, so that the city can make repairs and obtain a lien on
rents to secure reimbursement. 9 These are certainly strong-some
might say draconian-measures; yet, despite their presence, abominable slum housing conditions persist in very great quantity. What is
most notable about these remedies is neither their variety nor their
severity, but rather their four common weaknesses.
I. Because they are essentially public enforcement measures,
they embrace all the most unattractive elements of paternalism.
Although the tenant is a critically interested party, housing code enforcement is basically a two party proceeding, between the enforcement official and the landlord, with the former deciding when and in
what way to proceed, how vigorously to press enforcement,10 and
what remedies to seek. Since the tenant is not vested with the basic
prosecutorial initiative, nor with authority to control the proceeding,
some third party must make for him decisions which vitally affect his
interests, such as whether to take the risk that vigorous enforcement
will lead to abandonment, eviction, or rent increases. These are decisions which even the saintliest official would find it difficult to make
with proper discretion and sensitivity. Is it then any wonder that
housing code enforcement so often backfires, leaving its intended
beneficiaries puzzled, resentful, and hostile, and thus more ready
than ever to bite the paternalistic hand?
2. While almost everyone agrees that the slum tenant has been
wronged by the maintenance of seriously substandard housing, no
serious effort has ever been made to see that he is compensated for
the wrong that has been inflicted upon him. Ordinarily, enforcement
officials are highly pleased if their work results in future improvement
of the property; if they are successful in that effort, they are perfectly
happy to let bygones be bygones. As one writer aptly put it, public
authorities view their function as "obtaining compliance, not in
fining landlords." 11 Moreover, even where penal sanctions are exacted
-and they have traditionally been ridiculously mild12-the proceeds
9. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAw § 309.
10. Happily, there has been some movement toward tenant initiated remedies, but
public action is still the overwhelmingly dominant factor in enforcement. Gribetz
&: Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 CouJM. L. REv.
1254, 1289 (1966).
1I. Note, Administration and Enforcement of the Philadelphia Housing Code,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 449 (1958).
12. Gribetz &: Grad, supra note 10, at 1276; Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 275, 278 (1966); Comment, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 820-21 (1965). In 1965
in New York City the average fine per case was $13.96. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1966, p.
36, col. 5. See also LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING REsEARCH FUND OF COLU!IIBIA UNIVERSITY,
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSING ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, A PRELIMINARY REPORT PREPARED AS PART OF A STUDY OF HOUSING MAINTE•
NANCE STANDARDS AND ENFORCEMENT 18, 39. (Dec. 31, 1964).
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go into the public coffers; ordinarily not a penny goes to the tenant
who has been subjected to living in indecent housing during all the
time that the wrong went unremedied. While it is perhaps understandable that public officials look toward the future, it would hardly
be surprising to discover that the tenants involved are dismayed to
learn that the landlord who has deprived them of the benefits to which
the law entitles them is not viewed as having thereby committed a
wrong for which substantial redress may be had.18 Although it has
been customary to treat Negro claims for reparations as little more
than political rhetoric,14 it may be very wise indeed to attend seriously to the just claims which may, in particular instances, underlie
such demands.
Not only does failure to recognize a right to damages unjustly
trivialize past conduct, but it also ignores a factor so central to the
problems of poverty and civil rights that its nonrecognition by the
current legal structure can only be described as shocking. This element is the retributive instinct, a fact of life which has emphatically
shown its ugly side in the excesses of Watts and Harlem. The question
is not whether to recognize the legitimacy of that emotion; 15 but
rather whether we are to meet it in the streets or in the courts. However outsiders may evaluate the owner of a rat-infested, filthy, or
dilapidated building, it cannot be gainsaid that, to the tenant who
lives therein, such a landlord is the embodiment of everything unjust
in society.16 Unless and until we stop treating such owners as objects
of sympathetic concern, and begin to treat them as persons who have
13. The New York Rent Abatement Law (N.Y. MULT. DWELI.. LAw § 302-a) is a step
in the right direction insofar as it wholly cancels, rather than merely delays pending
repairs, the obligation to pay rent during the continuance of certain rent impairing
violations. Unfortunately, it refuses to go beyond a mere loss of bargain notion in its
view of the significance of the harm done to the tenant, and is thus painfully
reminiscent of the inadequacy of auto warranties which limited the manufacturer's
responsibility for defects to the cost of replacing defective parts. E.g., Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960).
14. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1966, p. 12, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1966, p. 30, col. 5.
15. See Schoenfeld, In Defense of Retribution in the Law, 35 PSYCHOANALYTIC
Q. 108 (1966); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 401
(1958).
16. It is instructive to compare the generous attitude taken by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, which found "that deterioration in housing is
seldom the result of wilful action by the owner," SPECIAL CoMMitTEE ON HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO MULTIPLE
DWELLING LAW PROVIDING FOR ABATEMENTS OF RENT TO TENANTS AFFECTED BY FIRE
liAzARDs OR CONDmONS DANGEROUS TO LIFE, HEALTH OR SAFETY, WmcH REMAIN UNCORRECTED FOR SIX MONTHS AFTER NOTICE 2 (Dec. 19, 1963), with the rather remarkable
"confessions" of a slumlord, appearing in a recent popular magazine: "The slumlord
must subscribe to a predatory code or go under • • • • The good guy, the mildly
greedy, humanoid slumlord, can't last•••• To be a good investor, he must learn to
reduce people to cash values ••• .'' Dahl, A White Slumlord Confesses, Esquire, July
1966, p. 92, 94..
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a large and long-overdue debt to pay, there is little reason to hope
that their social creditors-the potential initiators of violence-will
feel that justice has been done.
3. Another matter little considered in the present law, although
obviously central to the realities of enforcement, is the undeniable
fact that the deplorable conditions of slum housing are attributable
in significant part to the tenants themselves. This fact inevitably
undermines rigorous enforcement,17 and leads to that form of paternalism which views all tenants as non-culpable victims of an unfeeling social system.18 While the question of the culpable tenant
presents the nice philosophical problem whether the tenant is irresponsible because the landlord exploits him or whether the landlord is himself the victim of problem tenants, that dilemma need not
be faced. Instead, we must impose rigorous standards on the landlord
at the same time that, and only to the extent that, we give the slum
tenant a genuine incentive to maintain the property he rents. Again
the issue is paternalism: To enforce the codes for the benefit of all
tenants, whether or not they do the right things themselves, is to
view the tenant as an object to be acted upon and not as a potentially
responsible and self-reliant•citizen. In this perspective, the proposal
to be urged herein-that there be recognized a private tort action for
th awarding of substantial damages to the tenant who is not himself
culpable-may very well promote precisely that incentive to self-help
and self-reliance which is so central to the poverty problem.19 In
short, what is needed is not help, but incentive; not paternalism, but
opportunity.
4. Finally, and ironically, traditional code enforcement principles
tend to be self-defeating because they are largely built upon an erroneous economic premise. The essential assumption of code enforcement must be that the private owner of low-cost substandard housing
can be compelled to rehabilitate and still serve the same or similarly
17. Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing,
53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 319 (1965); Comment, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 810, 811, 823, 859 (1965).
18. For example, in one case in New York, the Rent Commi5.5ion granted a rent
reduction for failure of a landlord to repair a refrigerator deliberately damaged by the
tenant. 150 Holding Corp. v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm'n, N.Y.L.J., Dec.
14, 1955, p. 7, cited in SPECIAL COMMlTl'EE ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 16, at 3. Even to the extent that tenants are held responsible in law for their
conduct, enforcement of such responsibility has been largely illusory. Comment,
Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 810-11 (1965).
19. The point has often been made that ''[a) slum is not merely an area of decrepit
buildings. It is a social fact •••• Where the slum becomes truly pernicious is when it
becomes the environment of the culture of poverty, a spiritual and personal reality
for its inhabitants as well as an area of dilapidation." l!AruuNGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 140-41 (1962); see notes 140-48 infra,
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situated low-income tenants. All the evidence, however, points to the
unlikelihood of any such result where major rehabilitation is required. The failure of the private unsubsidized market to provide
new housing for the poor,20 the marked increase of rents after
rehabilitation, 21 the drop in real estate values in the face of serious
code enforcement,22 all suggest what has by now become widely
recognized: Standard housing for the poor, adequately maintained,
is simply not a sufficiently profitable business to attract investors.
Thus a vigorously pursued program of code enforcement is unlikely
to have any long-term effect except to contract the already inadequate supply of low-cost housing. For this reason, code enforcement
has traditionally degenerated into a watered down program in which
the landlord's ability to survive economically becomes the critical
issue. 23 The result, predictably, is a tendency to negotiate the tenant's
rights away with the hope that sooner or later an adequately financed
rent-subsidy or public-housing program24 will eliminate the slums.
In consequence, a vicious circle of non-action is created.25
What is needed is a prolonged program of economic pressure
which strikes, and strikes hard, at the slumlord. For the reasons
20. Hearings on H.R. 9751 Before the Subcom~ittee on Housing of House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 575 (1964); LASCH, BREAKING
THE BUILDING BLOCKADE 176-77 (1946); MEYERSON, TERRETT & 'WHEATON, HOUSING,
PEOPLE AND CITIES 294 (1962); WEAVER, DILEMMAS OF URBAN AMERICA 79 (1965);
WEAVER, THE URBAN COMPLEX 16 (1964).
21. MILLSPAUGH & BRECKENFELD, THE HUMAN SIDE OF URBAN RENEWAL 108 (1960);
NASH, R.EsIDENTIAL REHABILITATION: PRIVATE PROFITS AND PUBLIC PURPOSES 124-28
(1959); STERNLmB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 183 (1966); N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1966,
p. 38, col. 4.
22. Nash, op. cit. supra note 21, at 111.
23. An excellent example of official attitudes is provided in Steven Roberts' article
in the N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1966, p. 43, col. 3. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 10, at
1270-72, report cases in which criminal convictions for housing violations have been
reversed on grounds of economic hardship for the landlord. See Comment, Building
Codes, Housing Codes and the Conservation of Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 U. Cm.
L. R.Ev. 180, 186 (1963).
24. The Housing and Home Finance Administration (HHFA) explained the failure
of public housing in a very genteel way: "Through a combination of circumstances,
however, it has not been possible consistently to push this program with the vigor that
it demands. Some years prior to the advent of this Administration, activity in this
important area virtually halted." HHFA 18TH ANN. REP. 2 (1964). Another writer,
somewhat more pungently, said that, when it came to public housing, "Congressmen
tended to think small ••••" Seligman, The Enduring Slums, in THE ExPLODING METROPOLIS 121 (eds. of Fortune 1958). 1\Thether the grandiose hopes of the war on poverty
will significantly alter the pattern of congressional thinking remains to be seen.
At the moment, the prospect is. for a penurious Ninetieth Congress.
25. This is not to deny that code enforcement, rent strikes, or tenants' unions are
useful. It is simply to suggest that their successful functioning is limited to relatively
small jobs of repair or maintenance, where the landlord's economic viability is not
seriously affected. But this article is concerned with seriously deteriorated housing,
and it is in this context that our comments about the inadequacy of code enforcement,
rent strikes, and the like, are made.
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indicated above, only tenants themselves can be expected to prosecute such a program effectively. The tenants can undertake such
a program only when the law invests them both with an incentive to
act and with some hope that their action will not only break the
economic stranglehold of the slumlords, but will also produce some
financial reward to ease the transitional problems of potential evictions and higher rents.
We believe that recognition of a substantial civil damage actionone which holds that the slumlord who illegally maintains his premises in indecent conditions commits an actionable tort-may be a key
to the slum housing dilemma. It must seem ironic that the traditional tort action, so much maligned for its wastefulness, delay, and
cumbrousness, may be needed to supercede public enforcement, but
we think that a tort remedy is precisely what is required.
I. A REMEDY To Frr THE WRONG

A. The Intentional lnfiiction Tort
It is hardly a novel proposition today that, where one imposes
upon another a serious indignity to advance the actor's mm economic
purposes, an action for damages may lie. The brilliant work of Judge
Magruder, 26 Dean Prosser27 and others in developing the action for
intentional infliction of emotional harm has made that once radical
assertion a commonplace. Their great contribution consisted of
recognizing the need for a general tort category to redress conduct
"regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community"28-a need that arose because of the technical limitations of
such traditional torts as battery, trespass, and false imprisonment.
That the intentional infliction tort has gone a long way toward
fulfilling the need no one would deny. As it has developed, however,
the tort leaves a most serious and disturbing gap in the law. To
understand what that gap is and how it relates to the subject at issue
here, it is necessary to examine briefly the present content of the tort.
Under the definition contained in the Restatement of Torts,
liability arises only when one intentionally engages in "extreme and
outrageous conduct" and that conduct "causes severe emotional
distress to another ...." 29 The requirement that severe distress be
26. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L.
REv. 1033 (1936).
27. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1956); Prosser, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939).
28. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d at 73 (1965).
29. Id.§ 46.
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present as an element of the wrong is central to our concern here,
and it is most important to understand the reasons for its inclusion.
These reasons are twofold: First, of course, is the view that disturbance of the plaintiff's emotional tranquillity is itself the essence of
the wrong. In light of the problems which the tort was designed to
meet, such as the harassing bill collector or cruel practical joker, this
was a perfectly appropriate notion; the essence of these defendants'
conduct was precisely that they were attempting to infringe the
plaintiff's emotional well-being in order to serve their own purposes.
The second reason for the requirement of emotional distress
was a more technical and practical one. Since the term "outrage" had
little ascertainable content, it was understandably feared that actions
might be brought to redress even the most trivial social abrasions,
such as the harangues of a rude waiter or insolent taxi driver. To
require the presence of severe mental distress would assure that
recovery was permitted only for serious infringements, that is, those
infringements likely to result (and which in fact do result) in serious
emotional harm. Thus, whether conduct would be deemed outrageous would tum on whether the conduct would lead to "highly
unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry,
and nausea."30 In testing the severity of these reactions, "the intensity
and the duration of the duress are factors to be considered,"31 as is
the fact that "normally, severe emotional distress is accompanied
or followed by shock, illness, or other bodily harm, which in itself
affords evidence that the distress is genuine and severe."32
That these tests provide a rational means for excluding relatively
trivial conduct is clear enough. Whether they provide adequate scope
to make actionable all the forms of outrageous conduct which the
tort law ought to cover is, however, quite a different question; and
since the intentional infliction category is the sole generic tort
designed to cover extreme and outrageous conduct deemed "intolerable in a civilized community,"33 it is a question of considerable
importance.
The notion that the only outrageous conduct for which the tort
law ought to provide a remedy is that which is designed to and does
produce severe emotional harm-in the sense that the Restatement
defines such harm-is by no means clear, for such a notion implies
30. Id. comment j at 77.
31. Ibid.

32. Id. comment k at 78.
33. Id. comment d at 73.
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that the only interest worth protecting is that form of emotional
well-being represented by an absence of such symptoms as fright,
shock, grief and shame in their severe and disabling forms. The
propriety of this view may be tested by looking at some analogues
in constitutional law which also deal with outrageous conduct.

B. Constitutional Analogies
It is remarkable how closely the definition of outrage adopted by
the Torts Restatement-conduct which "go[es] beyond all possible
bounds of decency • . . and [is] utterly intolerable in a civilized
community"84--echoes the language used in the constitutional cases.
In his opinion in Irvine v. California, 85 for example, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter urged that the proper test was whether the conduct at
issue was such as to "offend civilized standards of decency and fairness,"36 recalling that, in Rochin v. California,81 the Court had held
the question to be whether the wrong was of such gravity as to "offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples . . . .''38 While the context in
which the Court has put the question changes, ranging from definitions of liberty,39 to asking whether the victim is subjected to "a
hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it," 40
to attempts to identify those basic but penumbra! values that emanate
from the specific terms of constitutional prohibitions,41 it is the same
essential inquiry.42 And it is precisely the inquiry which the Restatement of Torts formulates: When does conduct reach the point that
we will say it is intolerable in a civilized society?43
34. Ibid.
35. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
36. Id. at 144 (dissenting opinion).
37. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
38. Id. at 169.
39. E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (192ll).
40. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
42, This is not to suggest that the conflict within the Court over the proper
method of dealing with these questions is trivial from the point of view of proper
constitutional analysis. It is only meant to show that constitutional law has struggled
with the same basic question, in the context of outrageous conduct by government,
and that, as we shall see, it has never found it necessary to validate claims of infliction
of outrage by looking to the extent or presence of emotional upset on the part of
the victim.
43. It is notable that in these constitutional cases the courts find themselves using
the same sort of vituperative epithets so common in the intentional infliction tort cases.
For example, in a recent electronic eavesdropping case, the New York courts termed
the challenged action "reprehensible and offensive," "atrocious and inexcusable,"
"repulsive and repugnant." Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 149 (1962) (memorandum
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren).
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The parallel between the constitutional and tort tests is to be
expected, for, as has often been noted, many of the civil wrongs
synthesized into the intentional infliction genre are close counterparts
of constitutional rights. 44 The ordinary trespass has its constitutional
incarnation in the search and seizure cases,45 and the broader right
of privacy, of which trespass is but one form, has been an underlying
notion in such unconventional search and seizure cases as those
involving eavesdropping,46 as well as in cases based upon intrusive
commercialism on public transportation, 47 or attempts to compel
organizations to reveal their membership lists. 48 The constitutional
concepts involved in the freedom of travel cases, 49 as well as in the
prohibition against involuntary servitude,50 are intellectual companions of the tort of false imprisonment.
It is hardly surprising that there is a similarity and a very substantial overlap between that area of law designed to define and
provide protection for fundamental human rights against government infringements and that area designed to protect the individual
against private conduct deemed intolerable in a civilized society.
What is surprising, however, is that the tort principle, utterly unlike
its constitutional counterpart, has been viewed as requiring the
victim to suffer severe emotional distress as an indispensable prerequisite to recovery. 51 No such requirement has ever been thought to
be necessary for the recovery of damages in the parallel constitutional situations, and, indeed, any such demand there would seem
fatuous. For reasons which are obvious and well known, civil damage
44. E.g., GREGORY & KAI.VEN, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 822-23, 898 (1959);
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 392 (1960).
45. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
46. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
47. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
48. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965).
49. E.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1958).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
51. Perhaps one could argue that the parallel is imperfect because the sort of
conduct under discussion here, though similar in content in both the tort and constitutional context, is much more dangerous when carried on by the state than by
private persons. We would not dispute such an assertion, but it is most difficult to
conclude that the difference is so great that it goes to the very essence of the wrong,
with private infringements being significant only insofar as they impose substantial
disturbances of emotional tranquillity and governmental infringements standing by
themselves as infringements of liberty which need no such proof for their validation.
If evidence were needed of the dubiety of any such attempted distinction, one might
tum to the decline of the state action concept, where every effort has been bent to
bring essentially private action within the aegis of constitutional enforcement. E.g.,
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I
(1948). A similar development has taken place in the use of the authority to regulate
commerce among the states. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

March 1967]

Slumlordism

879

actions against officials for violation of constitutional rights have
been relatively infrequent, 52 but there are sufficient examples to make
the point clear. In Lane v. Wilson, 58 for example, a plaintiff who had
been deprived of his right to vote sued and recovered $5,000 for
infringement of that right. There was nothing in that case to suggest
that plaintiff's claim rested upon a demand to be compensated for
severe emotional ~istress, in the medical sense in which the Restatement seems to use that term, or for economic loss. It was enough that
he had inexcusably been deprived of a fundamental liberty, and
substantial damages were thought appropriate to redress that deprivation; in such circumstances, the gravity of the deprivation has never
been thought to be measured by the immediate psychic impact upon
the victim. Indeed, two hundred and fifty years ago, long before
courts dreamed of speaking in terms of severe emotional distress,
substantial damages were granted to individuals whose fundamental
social rights had been infringed. As Chief Justice Holt put it,
"If such an action [against one denying a vote] comes to be tried
before me, I will direct the jury to make him pay well for it; it is
denying him his English right." 54
It is not less serious to deprive one of the right to vote because
that deprivation fails to induce fright, shock, or similar responses.
In the same sense, it seems always to have been assumed that, for
invasions of privacy in the form of unlawful searches, a substantial
damage action would lie, not merely for severe emotional damage or
for economic loss, but as a monetary attempt to redress the loss of
liberty thus sustained. Surely it would be surprising to learn that the
Justices who relegated the petitioner in Wolf v. Colorado 55 to a
common law damage action (however unrealistic that may h?ve been
when one considers the prospect of recovery against police officers)
thought that his right to vindication should depend upon the presence of severe emotional distress or pecuniary loss, rather than upon
the loss of his liberty. Nor is it likely that the award of £300 granted
in the landmark case of Entick v. Carrington, 56 where officers rifled
the papers of one suspected of publishing seditious libels, was meant
52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652·53, 670 (1961); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
53. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
54. Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 958, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 138-39 (K.B. 1702).
55. 338 U.S. 25, 30 (1949).
56. 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). Professor Westin has recently
suggested that substantial liquidated damages be recoverable as a remedy for unauthorized surveillance. Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals
for the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1229 (1966).
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to redress that plaintiff's nervous response or to compensate him for
the cost of replacing the pamphlets taken.
Even more familiar today than the foregoing examples are those
cases in which substantial damages are allowed for deprivations of
the right to be free from racial discrimination. It shocks no one to see
a Negro recover for being denied service at a place of public accommodation, or for being victimized through violation of a fair housing
law,57 although by their very ordinariness, such acts are hardly likely
to cause severe emotional distress. 58 Of course, recovery in cases of
the sort mentioned _above ordinarily turns upon a statute granting a
right to substantial civil damages, but, for our purposes, it is irrelevant whether the source of the right is in a statute or in the common
law, as the identical results in the American (statutory) and English
(common law) voting rights cases demonstrate. The point is that we
consider it perfectly appropriate for one who has been deprived of a
fundamental liberty, whatever the observable emotional impact on
him, to recover substantial damages.
Seen in this perspective, it becomes increasingly clear that the
intentional infliction tort, for all its undeniable virtue, has oversynthesized the traditional torts in focusing so exclusively on severe
emotional harm. While many invasions of fundamental liberties
are of course likely to lead to serious emotional and physical injury
of the kind contemplated by the Restatement,59 it is equally true
that a good deal of outrageous conduct may not, and often will not,
have such results. 60 The mere absence of such results, however,
should hardly lead us to conclude that no serious wrong has been
done to the victim.
C. Implications of the Traditional Tort Law
The idea implicit in these comments--that it would be more
appropriate to view tort law as protecting substantive liberties, rather
than merely as protecting emotional tranquillity in the conventional
sense-was in fact very much the position of the traditional tort law.
It is only the modern intentional infliction concept which, while
57. E.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 40, 41.
58. As a recent newspaper article put it: "Despite the laws banning discrimination
in public accommodations, Negro travelers know they can expect snubs, insults and
outright rebuffs at restaurants, resorts and motels from Dixie as far north as Wisconsin." Snubs and Rebuffs Still Spoil Vacation Travel for Many U.S. Negroes, Wall
Street Journal, July 26, 1966, p. 1, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1966, p. XX-I,
col. 5.
59. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
60. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (racial discrimination); Lane
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1989) (interference with voting rights).
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properly rounding out the technical inadequacies of such old torts
as trespass and battery, has unfortunately tended to submerge the
substantive liberty point by excessive concentration on emotional
well-being. For example, in the old offensive battery cases, where
there was no great physical injury but merely an affront to the
plaintiff's dignity, the courts were quite ready to grant substantial
damages without worrying about severe emotional distress; they
assumed that the libertarian interest in freedom of the physical
person from indignant affronts was sufficient to permit the awarding
of large damages, however the loss might have been manifested upon
the victim. 61 Similarly, recovery for false imprisonment traditionally
required no proof of conventional damage beyond the fact of restraint on one's liberty.62 The list could easily be expanded, but the
lesson should be clear enough. In asking whether the tort of outrage
has been committed, and whether substantial damages ought to be
allowed, it is time to cease looking merely for emotional distress and
instead to ask whether the defendant's conduct infringes a substantive human interest of sufficient import that no civilized society
ought to tolerate it.
D. Nature of the Injury: The Inadequacy

of Tort Law Perspectives
The excessive concern with ascertainable evidence of emotional
harm manifested in the present law bespeaks more than a theoretical
error. By confusing the oft-present consequences of wrongs with the
substantive essence of the wrong, the law produces a narrowness of
outlook which creates a serious hiatus in the substantive coverage
of tort remedies.
Even in the most cursory examination of the wrongs for which
the intentional infliction tort has given a remedy, one cannot help
but be struck by the fact that this tort whose function is phrased in
the broadest terms-compensation for those wrongs so outrageous
that they must be deemed intolerable in a civilized society-has
in fact occupied itself substantially with isolated, occasional, and
bizarre occurrences, leaving virtually untouched the fundamental
social issues of the day. We find recovery for the acts of the cruel
prankster, the overbearing mortician, the oppressive bill collector,
and even the rude shopkeeper, but no significant body of law
has been developed to deal with such evils as slum housing, racial
61. E.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872).
62. PROSSER, TORTS § 12, at 55 (3d ed. 1964).
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injustice, and economic exploitation. The man who tricks a crazy
little old lady into believing that she has discovered the pot of gold
at the end of the rainbow receives the profound attention of the
court, 63 but the thousands of landlords who daily subject their tenants
to life in rat and garbage infested tenements, with no heat in the
winter and no ventilation in the summer, seem to have been completely ignored.
To be sure, the reasons for this peculiar allocation of legal
resources are many and complex, but clearly one of the most important is the determined focusing of attention upon the overt and
dramatic consequences, called severe mental distress, sustained by the
victim of unjustified intentional acts. It is easy enough to understand
why a legal test that looks for fright, shock, and horror as necessary elements of the ·wrong will find itself dealing with bizarre, extraordinary, and unexpected acts; these are the very types of acts which
evoke extraordinary and bizarre reactions by their victims. Conversely, such standards, useful as they are in filtering out everyday
trivialities, fail to recognize that the tragic essence of fundamental
social injustices is precisely that they are commonplace. One hardly
expects the slum tenant to wake up one morning and experience
profound shock, grief, and horror because his halls are filled with
garbage and his apartment infested with rats. The indecency of his
condition inheres in the fact that the outrage to which he is being
subjected has become an ingrained part of his life, and an accepted
fact of life to the surrounding community.
Ironically, considerable evidence suggests that the readily observable consequences of many of the most grievous wrongs are
almost precisely the opposite of those which the intentional infliction tort characterizes as evidence of outrage. A large body of
literature dealing with such subjects as racial discrimination,
Japanese relocation, brainwashing, and long-term incarceration indicates the inadequacy of a law which fails to take sufficient account
of the complexities, varieties, and cumulative effects which can
result from seriously outrageous conduct. For example, the tremendous pressures on one in a detestable situation to adapt to his environment and to seek to normalize his situation as a matter of self-defense
and survival64 are apparently not taken into account in our present
63. Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
64. This is what Robert Weaver calls "conditioning to a submerged status."
WEAVER, THE URBAN COMPLEX 30 (1964); see BROOM &: KrrsusE, THE MANAGED CASUALTY, THE JAPANESE AMERICAN FAMILY IN WORLD WAR II (1956); SCHORR, SLUMS AND
SOCIAL INSECURITY 12 (U.S. Dep't H.E.W., Social Security Admin., Div. of Research and
Statistics Research Report No. 1, 1963); U.S. CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING PROGRAM OF THE
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law dealing with outrageous conduct. Similarly, the significance of
imposed personality modifications, with all their intricate meaning, 65
seems to be ignored.
The contrast between the kinds of damage that can occur and
the much more limited view of damage evidenced in the current tort
law is strikingly illustrated by a study of the effects of intentionally
imposed chronic stress on Korean War prisoners:
It was difficult to maintain close group ties if one was competing
with others for the essentials of life, and if one spent one's resting
time in overcrowded huts .... Lines of authority often broke down,
and with this, group cohesion and morale suffered . . . . In this
situation goals became increasingly short-run....
What happened to the men under these conditions? During the
one to two week marches they became increasingly apathetic . . . .
[S]ome men became so apathetic that they ceased to care about their
bodily needs. They retreated further into themselves, refused to eat
even what little food was available, refused to get any exercise, and
eventually lay down as if waiting to die. The reports were emphatic
concerning the lucidity and sanity of these men. They seemed willing
to accept the prospect of death rather than to continue fighting a
severely frustrating and depriving environment.
Two things seemed to save a man who was close to such "apathy"
[from] death: Getting him on his feet and doing something, no
matter how trivial, or getting him angry or concerned about some
present or future problem .... In one case ... "therapy" consisted
of kicking the man until he was mad enough to get up and fight. 66
While the prisoners' situation was of course considerably more
severe and exacerbated than one would ordinarily encounter in a
tort case, it presents a telescoped, but nonetheless highly revealing,
view of the kinds of symptoms which tend to be engendered over
the long run by deplorable and seemingly inescapable living conditions. 67 Such examples are most instructive in suggesting how
SCHOOL FOR OVERSEAS ADMINISTRATION, INDIVIDUAL AND MASS BEHAVIOR IN EXTREME
SITUATIONS (1944).
65. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE
(1959); FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING (1963); LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM (1961); SCHEIN, SCHNEIER &: BARKER, COERCIVE PERSUASION
(1961) (Studies of Brainwashing in China). "[S]lums breed a hopelessness in peoples'
hearts.'' MILLSPAUGH &: BRECKENFELD, op. cit. supra note 21, at ix.
66. Schein, Reaction Patterns to Severe, Chronic Stress in American Army Prisoners
of War of the Chinese, J. Soc. IssuES, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 21, 22-23 (1957).
67. Speaking of the concentration camp as "a special and highly perverted instance
of human slavery," Stanley Elkins sees parallels between the way Nazi concentration
camps changed the personalities of the prisoners who survived and the way in which
slavery in the American South altered the personalities of Negroes brought from Africa
and shaped the character of the Negroes born here. ELKINS, op. cit. supra note 65, at
103-39. Perhaps a useful parallel can also be drawn between the effects on the per•
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lamentably naive and short-sighted the tort law has been in its view
of what constitutes legally remediable damage. 68
The example also demonstrates how much more enlightened the
interpreters of the constitutional law have been in analogous situations; their willingness, as indicated above, 69 to recognize grievous
social injustices as remediable wrongs, without searching for specific
types of medical trauma, represents an awareness of the long-term
and cumulative consequences of oppression, which consequences are
capable of no precise and clearly observable delineation in traditional
legal terms. This is to say that the accumulated evidence of the effects
of social injustice, as presented by psychiatrists and sociologists in
clinical form, has long been understood and accepted by the Court,
though in a different form. When it talks about conduct so shocking
that the polity cannot endure it, or about civilized standards of
decency and fairness, it is doing no more than observing from an
historical and political science perspective the cumulative destructive
effects of outrageous conduct on the society and its individual
victims-precisely analogous to what the psychiatrists observe in such
clinical contexts as that of the Korean War prisoners. In condemning
sonalities of concentration camp inmates and of slum inhabitants; both groups manifest obvious "emotional distress" through the widespread symptom of apathy. Compare SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 46, 71, 120 (1964), with FRANKL, op. cit.
supra note 65, at 35.
68. The quantity of studies dealing with the adverse effects of bad housing is quite
overwhelming. One hardly knows what to say of the evidence. The animal studies are
fascinating and provocative, but hardly conclusive. E.g., SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 64;
Calhoun, Population Density and Social Pathology, in THE URBAN CONDITION 33 (Duhl
ed. 1963). The correlation studies, comparing the situation of those within and
without slum housing, are likewise revealing, but insofar as they tend to suggest that
slums alone are the critical factor in social pathology, one must view them as naive.
Many such studies are discussed and cited in Wilner &: Walkley, Effects of Housing on
Health and Performance, in THE URBAN CONDITION supra at 215. Certainly improving
the housing of those in the culture of poverty will not, alone, bring to an end the
disabilities which that culture promotes; no more than remedying nutritional deficiencies in a concentration camp would terminate the ills of that culture of disorientation.
Nonetheless, that the conditions of indecent housing, and the pattern of exploitation
of which it is a part, contribute significantly to the making of that culture of poverty
and to the violent misbehavior which it produces is the conclusion of virtually every
observer. See notes 4, 19, 20, 21 supra, and notes 86, 93, 113, 125, 126, 140, 141, 147,
186 infra passim. To be sure, no one can produce proof of·this in the sense that one
can prove, in a battery case, that A broke B's leg, just as no one can prove the virtues
of democracy, free speech, or disinterested judges, but, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter once
said: "[T]here comes a point where this Court should not be ignorant as judges of
what we know as men." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949). One author, briefly
noting the possibilities for an action such as we propose, asked, "Has the time not
come for the Bar and Bench to accept that the situations described by James Baldwin,
Michael Harrington, Kenneth Clark and others are also cases of "personal injury •••
for which damages should be recoverable?" Joost, Rent Strike-New Legal Weapon?,
Trial, June-July 1966, p. 48.
69. See notes 34-60 supra and accompanying text.
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and granting relief against involuntary servitude, for example, one
can talk in terms of an invasion of liberty, noting the historically
observable consequences of such treatment; to this observation one
may give the name "deprivation of basic liberty," or "conduct intolerable in a civilized society." Much the same conclusion might be
reached by a study of psychological or sociological evidence. The
approach used is not critical; what is critical is that some approach
be used which makes it possible to come to terms with the realities
of social justice. In respect to this critical reality the tort law, as
presently formulated, fails.
The limited perspective of the tort law may be demonstrated
not only by reference to constitutional and psychological analogies,
but also by contrast to even such conventional examples as antitrust law. In that area, it has long been understood that anticompetitive behavior, the dramatic results of which are manifested largely
in cumulative effects on the economic structure of the society, reaches
that ultimately destructive point only through intermediate and
often intangible effects on particular victims.7° Consequently, the
treble damage action is a remedy uniquely responsive to the peculiar
problems created when unlawful conduct is doing damage far more
serious than overtly appears at a given time. Such a remedy not only
permits recovery in amounts beyond those capable of traditional
legal proof, but it also has two other important effects. First, permitting the recovery of very large damages implies a recognition that
the challenged conduct has an importance far beyond that which
it might seem to have if one attended only to presently observable
consequences. In this respect, the treble damage action serves to
resolve the dilemma created by the fact that the real importance of
the conduct might become apparent too late, that is, after the cumulative effects of the defendant's and others' acts had brought about
the very results which the law is designed to prevent.71 Moreover, by
granting treble recovery to private persons, the antitrust law recognizes that, though certain wrongs are in one sense violations of
the interest of the public at large, they are also wrongs which impinge
quite seriously upon individuals in the society; that adequate redress
can never be given merely by public remedies; and that very sub70. Some critics of the Court's approach in antitrust cases are upset precisely
because the breadth of analysis utilized in the constitutional area seems to have been
carried over to the merger cases. Handler, Atonality and Abstraction in Modern
Antitrust Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 621, 623-24 (1966). If this is the "New Gestalt" (id. at 623)
so be it; we need more of it.
71. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294-, 301 (1964-); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 221-22 (1938).
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stantial compensation is due those individuals who are the immediate
victims of the conduct under attack. 72
The relevance of these developments to the slum housing situation should be clear. As we have already observed, the difficulty slum
tenants have in establishing traditional kinds of damage is considerable. Yet, rather than viewing such difficulties as an indication that
nothing bad is happening, as the tort law is prone to do, those concerned with antitrust law have expanded their horizons so as to take
account of unconventional forms of damage. 73 Perhaps the best
example of this is the current concern over conglomerate mergers,
where it is now widely conceded that a large company's acquisition of
a firm in a competitive small-company industry is likely to have a
variety of inhibiting effects on the market, among them raising
psychological barriers to potential entrants and stifling the behavior
of incumbents who must now operate in the shadow of a giant.74 At
any intermediate point, such effects are likely to be manifested in
rather limited ways on any individual competitor, and at any stage
will probably be very difficult to reduce to traditional modes of proof.
While the extent to which damages will be given in recognition of
such effects has not yet been conclusively settled, there is some
judicial inclination to view the very consummation of an illegal
merger as an injury to the plaintiff's business for which a treble
damage action could be appropriate. 75 In taking such a view, the
72. Though the treble damage action is built upon a multiplier of actual damage
in the conventional sense, this does not convert the principle underlying it to a
conventional damage notion, but merely embodies the convenient fact that anticompetitive behavior, unlike voting discrimination or slumlordism, does have some
immediate economic consequences which provide a plausible basis for quantifying
the wrong. Only the multiplier effect is of interest here, and that is a quite arbitrary
one insofar as ordinary damage theory is concerned. It might just as well be double
damages, as some statutes provide, or some fixed sum-such as .$2,000-set as remedial
damages, which is to be given to the victim of the wrongful conduct. Rex Trailer Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956). See also N.Y. Times, July 17, 1966, p. 56, col. 7
(treble damages sought for tenants in rent control law violation cases).
73. In Continental Can, the Court said that where a merger is "inherently suspect,
elaborate proof" of the traditional kind "may be dispensed with" so that the courts
can reach conduct that affects not only "existing competition but that which is
sufficiently probable and imminent." United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441, 458 (1964).
74. See Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers, 64 COLUM.
L. REv. 500, 512-19 (1964); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1362-86 (1965). Similarly, the Court has taken
account of the probability that any significant merger is relevent not only for "its
intrinsic effect on competition," but because it has a tendency toward "triggering other
mergers." United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 464 (1964).
75. Highland Supply Co. v. Reynolds Metal Corp., 245 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 (E.D.
Mo. 1965); cf. Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Other courts have taken a much narrower view of the right to damages. Highland
Supply Co. v. Reynolds Metal Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v.
Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964).
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courts would bring themselves into alignment with the position
traditionally taken as to the appropriateness of damages for the violation of human liberties.
Moreover, the antitrust law has firmly recognized another factor
most relevant to the situation of the slum landlord. It is that defendant's immediate conduct cannot be isolated from its larger social
significance. Thus, though a slum landlord would undoubtedly recoil
from any attempt to link his conduct to ghetto riots, 76 the antitrust
law teaches that such associations are highly relevant. For example,
it has been held that it is not a defense in a merger case that the single
act under attack does not itself show the imminence of monopoly;
it is held irrelevant that "accretions of power are individually ...
minute." 77 Nor, as the Court made clear in Klor's, Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, lnc., 78 is anticompetitive conduct to be immunized from
a treble damage remedy "merely because the victim is just one
merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little
difference to the economy." 79 Individual acts must be tested, not in
isolation, but by whether in the aggregate they tend to create a
monopoly. The fact that other independent actors are promoting
that tendency by their independent conduct-far from being a
defense-is a factor enhancing liability.80 This is an approach well
worth keeping in mind when a slum landlord's culpability is tested
against the background of a market plagued by poverty, shortages,
the artificial restrictions of racial discrimination, and the presence
of other independent exploiters of the poor.
The courts' ability in the area of economic regulation to see the
importance of granting substantial and more than conventionally
provable damages, to recognize the cumulative significance of seemingly fragmentary behavior, and to do so in a form which "use[s]
private self-interest as a means of enforcement, ... arm[ing] injured
persons with private means to retribution ... ," 81 provides a model
which the tort law would do well to emulate.
E. The Need for a Vindicatory Element in the Law

There is yet another sense in which the intentional infliction tort
inadequately implements a vital function of the legal system, and
76. The responsibility of the landlord as an individual, as distinguished from the
responsibility of the society at large for slum conditions, will be discussed at text
accompanying notes 87-92 infra.
77. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333-34 (1962). See also United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461, 465 (1964).
78. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
79. Id. at 213.
80. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 (1962).
81. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947).
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again it is a sense in which the present generic tort has seemingly
eliminated a fundamental principle which was well known to the
traditional law. This is the role of the tort law in providing the
prospect of monetary redress for the victim of an outrageous indignity
in order to channel the instinct for retribution into acceptable
channels.82 Here again the social need for redress cannot properly
be measured by the presence or absence of "severe emotional distress," a point often recognized by traditional authorities. In the
famous old case of Alcorn v. Mitchell, 83 for example, where an
award of $1,000 was given after a disappointed litigant spit in the
eye of his opponent, there was no evidence that the plaintiff was
seeking recovery for any of the medical injuries ordinarily comprehended within the meaning of sever~ emotional distress, nor did
the court treat the case as involving any such injury. Its language
in this regard is most instructive:
The act in question was one of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retaliation by force, and the law, as far as it may, should
afford substantial protection against such outrages, in the way of
liberal damages, that the public tranquillity may be preserved by
saving the necessity of resort to personal violence as the only means
of redress.84
In one sense, to be sure, Alcorn could be viewed as consistent with
the Restatement test of mental distress, for one of the Restatement's
articulated symptoms is "anger." Moreover, in the context of the
immediate physical confrontation, the anger may have been observably intense. But Alcorn is notable not in the sense that it can be
made to conform to the present test, but rather in that its rationale
goes beyond that test, suggesting that an action should lie for outrageous conduct likely to lead to violent reprisal. In many instances,
of course, there will be no observable intense anger, but the ultimate
prospect of violence in retribution may exist in far more socially
significant ways than it did in Alcorn v. Mitchell.
This point was well stated by Jerome Hall in his discussion of
the function of some traditional torts which have conceptually
been subsumed within the intentional infliction genre:
[M]ost of these [torts] are intentional aggressions which usually imply
moral culpability, and almost always stimulate resentment.... In
82. For example, the function of defamation actions in preventing violence has long
been recognized. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 64 n.6 (1966). Our
point is not that intentional infliction cases contain no element of retribution, but
rather that they refuse to recognize that the need to provide retribution alone-even
where there is no conventional severe distress--is sufficient to give rise to a cause of
action.
83. 63 Ill. 553 (1872).
84. Id. at 554.
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this type of harm the law of torts frequently functions as a punitive
apparatus-the "fine" going to the injured victim of the aggression..•.
The civil judgment is an authoritative vindication of the injured
person's rights. Besides he is here not dependent on the public
authorities for prosecution, and remains master of the proceedings.85

The relevance of these observations to the situation of the slum
tenant need hardly be proved to anyone who has followed the recent
happenings in Harlem, Watts, Chicago, and elsewhere around the
nation. As one observer of slum life put it, the objects of slum
injustice develop "at each turn, symptoms of anxiety, despair, rage
and, finally, socially troublesome behavior, which means that all those
feelings come to their boiling point." 86 It hardly seems excessive to
observe that Alcorn v. Mitchell has begot progeny of frankensteinian
proportions to which the law must respond.
II.

ELEMENTS OF THE WRONG

The preceding section discussed in general the propriety of allowing a substantial civil damage action to be brought by a slum tenant
subjected to living in indecent housing. Nothing has yet been said of
what, precisely, is meant by "subjection," or what is comprehended
within the term "indecent." Thus the scope of the landlord's responsibility as an individually culpable wrongdoer, and the substance of
the wrong for which relief ought to be granted, remain to be
discussed.
A. The Culpable Landlord
Decent housing as a primary goal of society has been so long and
vigorously urged by Presidents, 87 the Congress, 88 distinguished
citizens,89 and local legislatures90 as to be beyond dispute. To make
85. Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: II, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 967, 977
(1943).
86. Coles, Our Streets of Violence, The New Republic, Sept. 5, 1964, p. 19, 21. See
also N.Y. Times, May 22, 1966, p. 70, col. 3.
87. no Cong. Rec. 114, 1103 (1964) (President Johnson); 107 Cong. Rec. 3641-42
(1961) (President Kennedy); 100 Cong. Rec. 737 (1954) (President Eisenhower); 95 Cong,
Rec. 74, 144 (1949) (President Truman).
88. 63 Stat. 413 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) ("the goal of a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family'').
89. "The goal of a decent home for every American family is an accepted national
objective." Weaver (then Administrator, U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency),
Foreword to HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, OUR. NoNWIUTE POPULATION iii (1963).
See also A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT HOUSING
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, RECOMMENDATIONS ON GoVERNMENT HOUSING POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS 256-57 (U.S. Gov't Print. Office, Dec. 1953); Report of the President's Commission on National Goals, in GoAI.S FOR AMERICANS 1, 13 (1960); Wurster, Framework
for an Urban Society, in id. at 225, 235 (1960).
90. E.g., N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 997, § 1.
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unexcused interference with the attainment of that goal a wrong
remediable at law would seem to be precisely the objective the
law ought to be pursuing.
As the following pages should make clear, nothing herein is meant
to suggest that the mere failure of society to realize some national
goal with respect to a given individual should give that individual a
tort action. Though adequate medical care for all might be an important national goal, the refusal by a doctor to accept as a patient
one too poor to pay his fees would not be tortious; to allow an action
in such a case would be to impose the cost of a broad social failure on
a single individual. We propose nothing of the sort; our much more
limited proposal is that one who undertakes to perform a service for
his own economic benefit, but who performs it in a way both inconsistent with those standards which represent minimum social goals as
to decent treatment and in a manner that itself is violative of the law,
under circumstances where the victim had no meaningful alternative
but to deal with him, commits a tort for which substantial damages
ought to lie.
There is, to be sure, a sense in which the slum landlord is the
product, rather than the creator, of the problem in which he is involved. That there is poverty, which creates the demand for v~ry lowcost housing, is not his fault; that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
maintain such housing in acceptable condition and still make an
adequate profit is likewise not a matter of his making; so too, the
failure of Congress to make available public housing or rent subsidies
in sufficient amounts to mitigate the problem is hardly something for
which he can be held individually responsible.
These are social problems for which only the community as a
whole bears responsibility. But no one seeks to impose liability upon
the landlord for the mere presence of these conditions. He becomes
culpable, and thus responsible as an individual, only when he capitalizes upon these social ills as the means to earn his livelihood. In
this sense he stands in the same position as one who employs children in a factory or mine; the fact that conditions may exist which
create a market for child labor hardly excuses the conduct of one
who affirmatively utilizes those conditions to make his way in the
world. The seller of narcotics or other illicit goods is not thought
less culpable merely because he caters to a condition not of his creation, or because the transaction is compelled by the exigencies of
human weakness and suffering rather than by any physical act of
force on his part. Nor can it diminish his responsibility that his own
economic survival depends upon giving as little as he does for the
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price he exacts. One would not dream of permitting a pharmaceutical firm to sell impure and adulterated drugs at low prices merely
because that was all they could afford to provide to the market of
the poor. Nor would we permit a doctor to give inadequate treatment, or a Ia-wyer inadequate representation, to the poor simply because their fees could not economically justify more ample services.
Our universal answer to such people is that they may stand aside
and do nothing if they wish, but if they undertake to provide services
for their own economic benefit, they must serve adequately or be
deemed ·wrongdoers in law. That society at large has failed in making
needed service available at prices all could afford is no excuse for
them as individuals.
There is, without question, the paradox that the government, by
failing to act, effectively creates the market for the defendant's services
at the same time that it declares unlawful through housing codes the
very conditions which may make the business of providing such
services profitable. It is in this sense true that the defendant is providing a needed service. It is also true that, by making the slum
housing business much less attractive, the prospect of substantial
damages would, in the short run, tend to contract an already overcrowded market, and thus seemingly disadvantage the very people
whom the action is designed to help. Indeed, it is this very logic
which has so often undermined rigorous enforcement of the housing
codes, engendering fear that unless a "realistic" position were taken
toward the landlord, more harm than good might result from the
enforcement of the law.91
This is the paradox which has created the present slum housing
dilemma. Landlords are insulated from effective law enforcement in
order to avert an intensification of the low-cost housing shortage;
yet this very insulation not only perpetuates the indecent conditions
of the slums, but also prevents the creation of the intense pressure
needed for legislative action by preserving the status quo in its more
or less stable (albeit deplorable) condition. At some point we must
admit that if we want this circle to be broken, some action substantially more vigorous than the utterance of pieties and the enactment of inadequately financed legislation must be taken. It
would be difficult to find a less unjust means of breaking that circle
than by reallocating some money from slum landlords to their
91. NASH, R.EsIDENTIAL REHABILITATION: PRIVATE PROFITS AND PuBLIC PURPOSES 103
(1959); Comment, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801,
802 (1965); Comment, Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conseroation of
Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 180, 186 (1963); N.Y. Times, Sept. 6,
1966, p. 43, col. 3.
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tenants through a procedure whereby the tenants themselves have the
authority to initiate and prosecute the suits.92
Those who propose action against slum landlords are often met
with the argument that the owners of these properties are not evildoers, but simply businessmen in a high-risk market who must, as a
matter of economic survival, take rather rigorous measures. From this,
it is often urged that those who attack "slumlords" are simply tugging
an emotional string and are oblivious to objective economic facts.
We hope to avoid these charges by making our position perfectly
explicit: We do not characterize the slum landlord as a conscious or
willing evildoer; we agree that he is probably doing precisely what a
rational profit-seeking businessman in his circumstances would feel
required to do. We simply say that if it is true that slum ownership is a
business which requires the maintenance of such indecent conditions,
then this is a business which needs to be eliminated. Moreover, let us
not be deluded by the landlord's continued emphasis on the economic pressures which the slum housing business imposes on one who
is in it; let us recognize that what we are condemning him for is going
into (or staying in) such a business. Nothing forced him into buying a slum, except his own profit expectations. If he inherited such
properties or found himself a landlord in a deteriorating neighborhood, nothing forced him to stay except his willingness to subordinate the life of his tenants to the prospect of some economic
loss. As long as a landlord is willing to see his tenants' children
bitten by rats in the night rather than take his losses and get out of
the business-and that is the choice which our potential defendants
have made-we see no need to wonder whether an injustice would
be done in characterizing them as tortfeasors. 93
92. For a discussion of what can be expected to happen to the market as a result
of some successful damage actions, and why we think the results to be anticipated
need not be feared, see text accompanying notes 211-13 infra.
93. It is not without relevance that observers quite uniformly find the slum
housing business to be a quite profitable one. THE FUTURE OF CITIES AND URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT 13, 19 (Woodbury ed. 1953); ILLINOIS GENERAL .AssEMl!LY, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON SLUM HOUSING AND RENT GOUG•
ING 3-4 (1965); I.AsCH, BREAKING THE BUILDING BLOCKADE 16 (1946); MILLSPAUGH &
BRECKENFELD, THE HUMAN SIDE OF URBAN RENEWAL 230 (1960); SCHORR, op. cit. supra
note 64, at 93-94; STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 76-88, 95-96, 106, 119 (1966);
Seligman, The Enduring Slums, in THE ExPLoDING METROPOLIS 120 (eds. of Fortune
1958). To be sure, quite another story is told by landlords, KLEIN, LET IN THE SuN
141-68 (1964), but on examination one sees that the landlords ordinarily measure
profitability only by contrasting income and expenses over a given period, failing to
consider that slum housing is often an investment where the real profits may be made
through sales which take advantage of such tax devices as depreciation. ILLINOIS
GENERAL .AssEMBLY, supra at 2; Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement
of Substandard Rousing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 320 n.83 (1965); cf. STERNLIEB, op. cit.
supra at 101-02, Alternatively, the management of the slum dwelling may be a holding
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B. Imposition by the Landlord: Absence of Free Choice
I. The Claim That the Tenant Should Allocate More
Money to Housing
The slum landlord should not be permitted the defense that his
renting of indecent housing is simply an ordinary market transaction,
voluntarily and knowingly entered into by the tenant. Though most
Americans enjoy incomes permitting considerable consumer choice
in the housing market, those who comprise the slum-housing population are overwhelmingly the very poor,94 those at or near the subsistence level.95 For these persons, the range of choice is exceedingly
operation through which the owner keeps his head above water while he waits for land
values to rise and bring him his profit. Dahl, A White Slumlord Confesses, Esquire,
July 1966, p. 92, 112. STEiu"ILIEB, op. cit. supra at 119, found that slum properties are
sometimes part of a falling real estate market, but this simply intensifies the pressure
for rental profits, generally through reduced maintenance. Moreover, it is not a
cause for sympathy that some buyers of slum properties, through lack of experience
or through ignorance, find themselves losing money; like the small speculator in the
stock market who finds himself overwhelmed by bigger sharks, the losing slum owner
may simply be the victim of his own greed. The potential defendants in these cases
are not those who invest in limited dividend low-cost housing enterprises, seeking a
very modest return on their money, NASH, op. cit. supra note 91, at 114-24, but rather
they are those who seek, and often get, large profits. SCHORR, op. cit. supra at 94; Seligman, supra at 120. While it may be true that many slum owners are themselves "little
fellows" rather than tycoons with thousands of properties, STERNLIEB, op. cit. supra
at 118, this hardly seems a basis for sympathetic treatment. It is a common and
unfortunate fact that the dirtiest work of exploitation is frequently left to small-timers,
with the owners of great capital able to make satisfactory profits in more respectable
investments. This simply proves that one with a million dollars can invest in bonds
and make a comfortable living clipping coupons, while the fellow with a few thousand
dollars must get his hands dirty if he wants to produce a satisfactory income from his
capital. But it is well to remember that not all small investors find themselves compelled to get rich quickly, and it remains to be shown why those who have such
desires ought to be permitted to fulfill them at the expense of the poorest people in
society.
94. ABRAMS, THE CITY Is THE FRONTIER 26 (1965); SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 64, at
98; TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON Low INCOME HOUSING, A REvmw AND APPRAISAL
OF NEW YoRK STATE'S Low INCOME HOUSING PROGRAM 37-38 (1963).
95. The President's Council of Economic Advisors originally defined the "poor"
as "those who are not now maintaining a decent standard of living" and set the
poverty line for a family of four at $3,000. H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 88TH
CONG,, 2D. SESs., POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Comm. Print 1964). The Social
Security Administration found $3,100 necessary for a non-farm family of four to live
decently on an "economy-plan" budget and $3,980 for the same family on a "low-cost"
budget. Orshansky, Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile, 28 Soc.
SEc. BuLL. 3, 10 (1965). The Bureau of Statistics of the United States Department of
Labor has not yet published a minimum or subsistence budget, but it plans to do so
soon. See note 99 infra. Higher estimates than these have been given by respected
authorities, including the widely cited budget prepared by the Community Council
of Greater New York which found that a typical four-person household in 1963
required $6,268 for an "adequate" living standard. THE COMMUNITY COUNCIL OF
GREATER NEW YoRK, A FAMILY BUDGET STANDARD 58 (1963). Even the Community
Council's criteria have been described as yielding a "low estimate of the cost of
living," MORGAN, DAVID, CoHEN & BRAZER, INCOME AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED
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narrow. Having allocated a reasonable sum to housing, further outlays for shelter can be made only by reducing below the subsistence
level their allocation for food, clothing, medical care, and other
personal necessities.
The dilemma for such families is best illustrated by a specific
example. The Philadelphia subsistence budget96 developed by the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare-a budget which is
typical of those in use in other major metropolitan areas--shows that
an average family of four needs an annual income of $3,168 to "maintain a minimum standard of health and decency." 97 Of this, only $68
per month ($816 per year or 25.7 per cent of total income) can be
allotted as an "approximate maximum" 98 for rent; excluding fuel and
utilities, without depriving the family of other basic requirements.
Any slum tenant with such an income and paying this maximum
toward rent has only a Robson's choice: He can remain in indecent
housing and suffer the consequences, or he can overallocate to rent
and deprive his family of other necessities of life. To say that a tenant
who has made a rational allocation-paying the maximum rent he
can reasonably afford, but no more-should be denied his action
because he did not exercise that theoretical choice to underallocate
to other necessaries is to drain any meaning from the idea of "choice."
To have a choice is to have tenable alternatives; the subsistenceincome tenant who takes what he can get for the maximum rent that
he can afford is exercising about as much free choice as the customer
who acquiesces in the terms of a utility or common carrier's service
contract.
STATES 189 (1962). A $3,000 budget allows a family of four a daily expenditure
of only $.70 per person for food and $1.40 for all other needs including rent, clothes,
medical care, etc. Yet, according to the 1960 census, about 34.5 million people
subsisted at incomes below this minimum poverty line. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty,
and the Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 407, 422 n.44 (1966); Miller, Who Are the
Poor'!, 200 THE NATION 609 (1965). See also David, Welfare, Income, and Budget Needs,
41 REv. OF EcoN. AND STATISTICS 393-99 (1959); N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1966, p. 12, col. 5.
96. These budgets, used to determine state allowances for public assistance, represent the considered judgment of individual state research councils as to the minimum
cost for decent living for various family compositions. Each budget works out in
scrupulous detail the differing needs for families, taking into consideration factors
of family size and location, ages and sex of members, and any individual disabilities.
97. PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, PuBLIC AssISTANCE .ALLOWANCES COM·
PARED WITH THE COST OF LIVING AT MINIMUM STANDARD OF HEALTH AND DECENCY 7
(1965). Pennsylvania figures for both housing and the cost of living are used simply
for illustrative purposes. Budget estimates from other areas differ somewhat.
98. "Approximate maximum" costs are those which are exceeded by only 5% of
the actual payments for shelter. PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, op. cit. supra
note 97, at 1. If the cost of fuel and utilities is included in housing costs, as it is in the
Housing and Home Finance Agency estimate of what low-income families can pay for
rent, see note 103 infra, then the rent-income ratio for the Pennsylvania family of
four at subsistence is 32 per cent, instead of 25.7 per cent. Id. at 17.
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If, in the case of a person with a subsistence income, a court is
going to consider a landlord's assertion that there is no imposition
because the tenant is free to adjust upward his allocation to shelter,
it must take notice of the facts in the real world. An appropriate way
to do so would be to look to the subsistence budget promulgated by
the local welfare agency or some similar reliable entity.99 Where the
tenant is already expending the appropriate maximum for shelter,
any argument designed to exculpate the landlord on the ground that
the tenant has "chosen" to spend as little as he has on rent should be
denied, and the action should be permitted to go forward. 100 On the
other hand, where it can be determined on the basis of such budget
studies that the tenant is significantly under-allocating to rent, the
landlord should be permitted to prevail.101
Obviously, not many prospective plaintiffs will have incomes
precisely at the subsistence level. A number will be below the
standard and some will be slightly above it.102 Calculating the maxi99. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, is currently planning to
issue a minimum budget for the major metropolitan areas. Letter from Mrs. Helen H.
Lamale to Joseph L. Sax, Dec. 13, 1966.
100. In advancing this suggestion, we are perfectly aware that neither the subsistence line nor the internal allocations of income suggested in such studies are without
imperfections. Not only do judgments differ as to appropriate averages, but the needs
of different families also will differ depending on quite individual circumstancessuch as the provision of services gratis by friends or relatives-which are not taken
into account by the budget studies despite the fact that in many ways such studies
are quite sophisticated. The question, however, is not whether there is a perfect
standard, but whether in the absence of perfection there is a workable standard. We
are convinced that there is. The alternative is either to let every tenant recover,
regardless of the fact that he may have underallocated to shelter, or to let no tenants
recover, thus totally ignoring the essence of the economic problems of the very
poor-the fact that they live at a subsistence level. Since it is the landlord defendant
who would raise the issue of choice, it would seem only proper that he acquiesce in
the use of some standard which makes it possible to deal rationally with that issue.
IOI. In some circumstances there may be a very uneven price progression in
housing costs, so that, while minimum decent housing costs significantly more than
the tenant can afford, housing at the next step down the ladder in quality is available at somewhat less than he can maximally afford. Ku:rN, LET IN THE SUN 34 (1964);
SI:ERNUEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 70 (1966). Such a tenant may thus be paying
less than he can afford for his present housing, not because he prefers to underallocate
to rent, but because any meaningful improvement in his situation would require more
than he can afford. ·we would permit such a tenant an action, but only if he could
show that decent housing was not available to him even if he were willing to allocate
all he could afford.
102. As income rises significantly above the subsistence level, a family develops
sufficient discretionary buying power to acquire true consumer choice. We need not
be concerned about drawing the precise income line at which this qualitative change
occurs, since the number of families who have true consumer choice and still
live in seriously substandard housing is almost nil. Thus, as a practical matter, we
are concerned only with those slightly above the subsistence level, and the test to be
proposed for them may confidently be applied to all those plaintiffs in indecent
housing. The possibility that someday a plaintiff will appear with a $30,000 income
but living in seriously deteriorated housing, can be dealt with when it arises. See note
165 infra.
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mum appropriate rent for them requires a very simple adjustment.
Starting with the maximum appropriate rent for a subsistence family
in plaintiff's position, one merely need add or subtract a proper
percentage for each dollar of incremental income above or below the
subsistence line.103

2. The Claim That the Tenant Could Have Made
a Better Bargain
The slum landlord also should derive no benefit from the citation
of official housing census figures to the effect that better housing is
available at prices low-income tenants can afford.104 Rather than
evidencing the presence of a real choice for the plaintiff and either
unconcern about or a positive preference for indecent housing, such
figures demonstrate the treachery of bare statistics. While a good
many tenants with incomes as low as those in the worst housing live
in standard dwellings, close examination reveals that they are principally small, elderly, white families, many of whom live in rooming
houses and pay a high proportion of their income for rent so as to
secure decent housing.105 For the poor working family that is largewhere non-shelter requirements consequently consume a much
greater portion of income-there is a grave housing shortage;100
103. Although 20% of income is generally viewed as an appropriate allocation to
shelter, HHFA, 18th ANN. REP. 19-20 (1964); SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 64, at 100-01. In
fact many poor families pay considerably more. AllRAMs, op. cit. supra note 94, at 42.
There is now some official basis for adopting a 25% figure. H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965). Either figure could properly be adopted for use here. One way
of implementing the adjustment using the 20% figure would be to add or subtract
twenty cents for each incremental dollar. For example, assume that the subsistence
income for a family of plaintiff's size and composition were $3,000, and that the
appropriate annual rent were $750. If plaintiff's income were $2,500, his appropriate
rent would be $750, less 20% of the $500 by which his income falls below subsistence,
or $650; if his income were $3,500, his appropriate rent would be $800.
Another acceptable means of making this adjustment is to use the median rentincome ratio for families in the plaintiff's income range. Thus, on the same facts as
above, if the median family with an income between $2,000 and $3,000 pays 23% of
its income for shelter, the appropriate rental allocation for a plaintiff with $2,500
income would be $750 minus 23% of $500. The appropriate rental for a family with
$3,500 would be $750 plus 23% of $500.
104. In Philadelphia, for example, 28% of all households have incomes below
$4,000, yet about -three-fourths of these households live in standard dwellings.
GREENBERG, CHARACTERISTICS OF Low INCOME AND BADLY HOUSED HOUSEHOLDS IN THE
PHILADELPHIA REGION 3 (Working Paper No. 8, Phila. Housing Ass'n Policy Comm.,
1964). See also FISHER, TWENTY YEARS OF PUBUC HOUSING 220-22 (1959).
105. GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 104, at 4-5; NATIONAL CONF. ON LAW AND
POVERTY, REPORT ON LAW AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (June 23-25, 1965).
106. GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 104, at 4; NATIONAL CoNF. ON LAW AND POVERTY,
op. cit. supra note 105, at 13 n.37. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 88-93 (1966),
reports a very high slum vacancy rate in Newark, but does not identify the size of
units involved. He finds also that this has not forced rents down.
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where, in addition, the family is non-white, the problem is further
intensified.107 In Philadelphia, for example, "[if] no household paid
more than 20 per cent of its income for rent, there would be a gap of
66,000 between the number of extremely low-income households and
the number of standard low-rent units in the region's housing
stock." 108 Hence, the mere presence of some standard" low-cost units
hardly suggests that those who live in substandard housing prefer it;
rather, the statistics simply indicate that a low-income tenant's opportunity to procure decent housing is contingent on his family's size,
composition, and race. In short, the relatively good housing situation
for little old white ladies living on their pensions does not present a
choice that can be exercised by a Negro family with a working
father and a number of growing children.
Even in those situations where better quality housing is physically
available in other areas of a city, the problem is a good deal more
complex than the statistics would make it seem. For unless we are to
assume that low-income tenants prefer crowded rat-infested dwellings
to decent housing-which is less than likely-the reason for the slum
tenant's failure to move to better housing is no help to the landlord.
For example, a seeming preference to remain in the slums may be
due to "neighborhood attachment." The preservation of ties which
people have to their neighborhood, family, and friends are now
understood to be as essential to the checking of urban blight as is the
improvement of physical facilities themselves. As one authority astutely observed:
Unslumming hinges, paradoxically, on the retention of a very considerable part of a slum population within a slum. It hinges on
whether a considerable number of the residents and businessmen of a
slum find it both desirable and practical to make and carry out their
own plans right there, or whether they must virtually all move elsewhere.100

Congress has recently recognized the significance of such factors, and
has modified the urban renewal process with an important emphasis
107. NATIONAL CONF. ON LAW AND POVERTY, op. cit. supra note 105, at 13 n.37; NEW
YORK CITY RENT AND REHABILITATION .ADMINISTRATION, PEOPLE, HOUSING AND RENT
CONTROL IN NEW YORK CITY 7, 90, 94 (1964); SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 64, at 81-82.
108. GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 104, at 4.
109. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 272 (1961). See also
ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 262-63 (1955); CONNECTICUT .ADVISORY COMM'N, U.S.
CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT 26 (1963); FOOTE, Anu-LUGHOD, FOLEY &: "WINNICK,
HOUSING CHOICES AND HOUSING CONSTRAINTS 123 (1960); GLAZER &: MCENTIRE, STUDIES
IN HOUSING AND MINORITY GROUPS 165 (1960); G. &: E. GRIER, EQUALITY AND BEYOND
36 (1966); HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 144 (1962); Fried, Grieving for a Lost
Home, in THE URBAN CoNDmON 151 (Duhl. ed. 1963).
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on conservation and rehabilitation. 110 It would be unfortunate indeed
for the courts to make a tenant's claim tum on his willingness to
repudiate the very values that the rest of government is now striving
to preserve.
Even more obvious than "neighborhood attachment" is the restriction on mobility imposed by racial discrimination which substantially confines non-whites-who bulk large in the ranks of the
poor111-to the ghettos where the worst housing is concentrated.112
Language problems and consumer ignorance also work to restrict the
mobility of poor people.113 These are factors which negate the seeming ability of the poor to go elsewhere and participate in that great
satistical bounty of decent housing. What a cruel hoax it would be
to deny a remedy on the theory that such theoretically available
better housing proves the slum tenant's freely expressed preference
for his dilapidated cold water flat.
To the extent that a landlord might be able to show the availability of some better apartments not subject to any of the foregoing
objections-that is, apartments of equal spaciousness within the
neighborhood and with no racial impediments to their availabilitysuch evidence, rather than serving as a defense, would seem to intensify his culpability. For he would thereby demonstrate that he was
giving even less housing for the money than were his competitors.
Insofar as such conditions exist, they would appear to prove precisely
the opposite of what the landlord is trying to show, which is that he
is simply operating in a free market situation. Such market imperfections suggest that shortages are so intense that the equalizing
effects of competition have broken down, that he is taking advantage
of ignorance produced by widespread lack of market information due
to an absence of advertising, or that he is taking advantage of ignor110. H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 27 (1965); Stein, The Housing Act
of 1964: Urban Renewal, 11 N.YL.F. 1, 12·13 (1965); Note, Enforcement of Municipal
Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 803 (1965); Comment, Conservation and Re•
habilitation of Housing: An Idea Approaches Adolescence, 63 MICH. L. REv. 892 (1965);
Comment, Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conservation of Chicago's Housing
Supply, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 180 (1963).
111. ABRAMS, op. cit. supra note 94, at 26; HARRINGTON, op. cit. supra note 109, at
61-81; HOUSING AND Ho11rn FINANCE AGENCY, OUR NONWHITE POPULATION 36-37 (1963);
NATIONAL CONF. ON LAW AND POVERTY, op. cit. supra note 105, at 20; NEW YORK CITY
RENT AND REHABIUTATION ADMINISTRATION, op. cit. supra note 107, at 95.
112. FooTE, .ABu-LUGHOD, FOLEY &: WINNICK, op. cit. supra note 109, at 126; GOLD·
BLATT, NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE COST AND QUAUTY OF
HOUSING IN WHITE AND NEGRO AREAs OF NEW YORK CITY 3 (1960); MENDELSON, DISCRIMI•
NATION 115-16 (1962): Weaver, Major Factors in Urban Planning, in THE URBAN CoN•
DITION 102-03 (Duhl. ed. 1963).
113. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 49 n.l (1963); PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CoN·
SUMER INTEREST, THE MoST FOR THEIR MONEY 7 (1965); Richards, Consumer Practices
of the Poor, in Low INCOME LIFE STYLES 74 (Irelan ed. 1966).

March 1967]

Slumlordism

899

ance or language barriers common to the immigrant groups that so
heavily populate slum areas.114 Whatever the specific explanation in
a given case, these factors show precisely what the tenant needs to
show to make his case: that his situation is not the product of any
informed market choice among available alternatives.
Finally, it must be noted that the essentially monopolistic situation is not abated by any rush into this lucrative market of new
entrants who would, by increasing the supply, reduce severe shortages
and thus either force prices down or push quality up. For, unlike a
classical situation of excess demand, this market is a tightly restricted
one. The poverty of the consumers imposes quite low ceilings on the
rents which can be paid. Thus entry to the market is limited to those
who can afford to provide additional housing for the low-cost market
at a capital outlay small enough to permit the potential rentals to be
profitable. But it is precisely the gap between the costs of building or
buying housing for the poor and the potential return on such investment that has prevented the building of new private housing for the
poor115 and, along with racial restrictions and existing shortages in
moderate-income housing, has made the filtration process-the conversion of older, moderately-priced housing into low-cost housingextremely slow and utterly inadequate.116 These facts, added to the
unwillingness of legislatures thus far to fill the gap with enough
public housing, have continued to assure the ability of the slum landlord to impose indecent housing on the poor on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.

3. The Absence of a Desire To Do Harm as a Defense
Another formal sense in which the slum dwelling situation differs
from the usual case is that here the landlord has no intentin the sense of desire-to harm the plaintiff. His only interest is an
economic one, and the damage incurred by the plaintiff may be
viewed by him not only as undesired, but also as unfortunate and
regrettable. The Restatement, on its face, would seem to give some
credence to this distinction, for its definition of the intentional
infliction tort requires the defendant to have intended that emotional harm be the consequence of his act.117 The illustrative
114. GLAZER 8: MCENTIRE, op. cit. supra note 109, at 168.
115. See notes 20 8: llO supra.
ll6. HHFA, 16TH ANN. REP. 18 (1962); MEYERSON, TERREIT 8: WHEATON, HOUSING
P.EOPLE AND Cm.Es 10 (1962); W.EAVER, THE URBAN COMPLEX 50-51 (1964).
117. "The rule ••• creates liability only where the actor intends to invade the
interest in freedom from severe emotional distress." REsTATEMENT (S.ECOND) OF TORTS
§ 47 comment a at 80 (1965).
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example is that of a defendant who shoots at the plaintiff's dog in
order to terminate its annoying barking.118 It is said that no action
would lie on these facts. Apparently the point is that it would have
been a much more serious and outrageous act if the defendant's
purpose had been to torment the plaintiff, whom he knew to be
deeply attached to the dog.119
Such a distinction merely suggests that a desire to inflict pain
on the plaintiff may make an act much more culpable than it would
have been absent that motive. But the example hardly proves that
an act cannot be outrageous in the absence of such a motive. For
example, if a foster parent were to starve his ward simply in order
to save money, without having any enmity at all toward the child
thus abused, we think it would be readily agreed that the act was
outrageous. Or, to take an example closer to that of the Restatement,
if, with perfect good will toward all concerned, one were to murder
a neighbor's child in order to quell nocturnal crying which disturbed
his sleep, it would hardly be thought odd to characterize the act
as outrageous.120 Though it would no doubt be worse to have starved
or murdered the hypothetical child for purely sadistic reasons, it
seems not at all unreasonable to suggest that an economic motivation is quite monstrous enough to earn the epithet "outrageous."

4. The "But For" Test as a Defense
The problem of causation, although implicitly considered already, perhaps deserves another word. Because there are always a
variety of sellers in the market, the landlord may very well seek to play
the old "but for" game. Since housing is essential, and since the lowcost housing offered by all sellers may be essentially the same, it might
be argued that, "but for" the landlord's act, the tenant would have
found himself in deplorable housing anyway. While we would be
pleased to see such a claim made since it would aid the monopolistic,
captive market analysis made above, it does not help the landlord
even in the causation context. It is, of course, settled beyond cavil in
118. Ibid.
119. See id. § 46 comment f, illus. 11, at '76.
120. The precise position of the Restatement as to such a case is unclear; it may
be willing to impose liability where the defendant can be held to know that serious
harm of a kind which he did not intend is likely to occur. Id. § 46 comment l. If this
is what is meant, and if the Restatement is not merely adopting the view that one
who murders a husband in the presence of the wife also wants to hurt the wife, then
the Restatement position is consistent with that urged here insofar as the question
of desire to do harm to the plaintiff is concerned. Insofar as the Restatement requires
the nature of the harm to be "severe mental distress," as indicated earlier, we believe
that such a limited view must be revised.
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the law of torts that where two defendants each act upon the plaintiff
simultaneously, causing him injury, neither may exculpate himself
by urging that, "but for" his act, the injury would have come about
anyway. 121 The obvious reason for such a rule is that otherwise each
wrongdoer would be able to point the finger of blame at the other,
with the absurd result that each would go free and the plaintiff, who
suffers under the fortuity that he was twice wronged, would go without remedy. A fortiori, where the defendant was the sole cause, the
analysis is equally applicable.

III.

THE PROBLEM OF THE CULPABLE TENANT

Slum landlords are the evil that produce the ghetto.
-A Harlem Tenant.122
There's really no such thing as a slum landlord-only slum tenants.
-A Chicago Landlord.123

These statements indicate more than naked self-interest on the
part of landlords who rent, and tenants who inhabit, slum housing.
Outside observers too have subscribed to these Manichaean positions
which attribute the etiology of slums solely to landlords or to the
poor. Those who blame the poor for their own plight are perhaps
compelled to do so for the reason explained by Nathan Straus:
I know that the people who live in the slums are human beings
like my own mother, father, brothers, sisters, like my own children.
Since this is the case, it is unbearable to me that they should be
forced to live in unhealthful and disease-breeding surroundings. The
idea is revolting, and doubly so because I am a part of the society
which tolerates these conditions. The sense of guilt which I would
feel were I to admit that the misery of these human beings is a
responsibility of mine would be more than I could endure. . • •
Rather it must be the responsibility of the families who live in these
bad surroundings. Yes, that is the solution of my own inner conflict.124
Conversely, those who put all blame upon the landlords may be influenced by a view of the poor as "The Proletariat" who have a class
morality and can do no wrong.125
Tragically, there is truth to both positions, for poverty is a culture
121. PROSSER, TOR'IS § 41, at 242-45 (3d ed. 1964). This sort of defense has also been
rejected in pollution cases. E.g., People ex rel. Stream Control Comm'n v. Port Huron,
!105 Mich. 153, 157, 9 N.W.2d 41, 43 (1943).
122. Sign at a demonstration protesting housing conditions in East Harlem. N.Y.
Times, May 31, 1964, p. 45, col. 4.
123. Satter, West Side Story, The New Republic, July 2, 1966, p. 15, 16.
124. STRAUS, THE SEVEN MYTIIS OF HOUSING 146 (1944).
125. Moynihan, Three Problems in Combatting Poverty, in POVERTY IN AMERICA 41,
50 (Gordon ed. 1965).
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that perpetuates itself. 126 The slum landlords contribute to the existence of poverty, but the poor themselves are also both a cause and an
effect of poverty. Consequently, any practical solution to the problem
must come to grips with both of these facts. Proposals to help correct
indecent housing should not "ask of the poor that they get up and
act just like everyone else in the society" any more than one should
"demand of cripples that they run races."127 But neither should courts
treat the poor patemalistically, thereby conferring upon them an
additional status of inferiority. Instead, a showing of responsibility
must be required of slum tenants and at the same time some incentive must be provided for the assumption of that responsibility. The
following comments are designed to articulate standards, within the
context of the civil damage action, to meet this need.
First, one must be careful to note that, while slum dwellings with
television antennae on _the roofs, automatic washers and dryers inside,
and automobiles outside may indicate an irresponsible tenant, they
may also indicate a budget-minded tenant who finds installment
payments on the washer and dryer cheaper than regular visits to the
laundromat; 128 or a responsible parent who desires to supervise her
children while doing household tasks and thus provides them
with inexpensive and popular entertainment in the form of television.129 An automobile may represent a quite rational investment
for one who lives far from his job and lacks adequate public transportation. Other seemingly needless possessions may point to a tenant
who was the victim of an unscrupulous merchant,130 or may represent
a form of "compensatory consumption,"131 fulfilling a need which
does not even exist for other groups in the society. Thus Millspaugh
describes the popularity of large colorful automobiles as
a symptom of the slum dwellers desire for escape. "Staying at home,
you're always reminded of the conditions you live in," said [a Baltimore housing inspector], "so you have an automobile to drive around
to another part of town. Even if you merely go to visit friends in
another slum, it isn't yours."132

The very poor live in a milieu that is in many ways as far removed
from us as is the agrarian society of eighteenth century America, and
126. HARRINGTON, op. cit. supra note 109, at 141; Lewis, The Culture of Poverty,
Scientific American, Oct. 1966, p. 19, 21.
127. HARRINGTON, op. cit. supra note 109, at 138.
128. CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MoRE 38 (1963); Richards, supra note 113, at 71.
129. CAFLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MoRE 37 (1963).
130. Id. at 16, 25, 29; Mn.I.SPAUGH &: BRECKENFELD, op. cit. supra note 9!1, at 9-11;
N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1966, p. 1, col. 8.
131. CAPwvrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE 13 (196!1).
132. MILLSPAUGH &: BRECKENFELD, op. cit. supra note 9!1, at 24.
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just as the law has, in recognition of the change from eighteenth century society, modified its concept of such things as the "reasonable
man," 133 so we in this context must recognize that "what is objective
reason on one [environment] is unreason ... on another." 134
This point is rather forcefully demonstrated in a recent study
supported by the National Institute of Mental Health.135 A mother
who kept her children home from school was found not to be unconcerned about education or truancy, but rather to be embarrassed to
send the children to school hungry at a time when there was no food
in the house.136 One researcher concluded:
[M]any seemingly clear cases of child neglect were actually a means
of independence training. Some mothers, [it was found,] seem to
withhold affection not because they reject their children but because
they want to train the children away from dependency on them. They
have to get each child "out of the way" as soon as possible in order
to go on to the next child.131
A jobless husband, discouraged after unsuccessfully making the
rounds, stole a radio to get some money. He was arrested and placed
on probation, but he said that he would steal again if he was faced
with the same circumstances. "Then his voice trailed off in anger:
'You have to do something .... I mean, when you're home and your
child asks for a piece of bread, and you [can't] give it to him ... .' " 138
The television set or automobile is thus no more an obvious sign
of irresponsibility than it is a symbol of virtue or reason. To identify
and evaluate the meaning of consumer behavior in each particular
instance is a perfectly hopeless task, but for the purpose of devising a
workable judicial rule there would seem to be a sensible way out of
the dilemma. Where a tenant's expenditures are such that he is
paying less for shelter than is reasonable for his family as
determined by the rent-income ratio,139 we would allow the landlord
a defense to the action, however rational the under-allocation may be
1!13. PROSSER, ToRTs § !13, at 170 (!Id ed. 1964).
1!14. BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH 29 (1957). Thus, as Brecht's
St. Joan said, it may be "[n]ot the wickedness of the poor have you shown me,
but the poverty of the poor.'' Saint Joan of the Stockyards, in SEVEN PLAYS OF BERTOLB
BRECHT 178 (Bentley ed. 1961). See also Low INCOME LIFE STYLES (Irelan ed. 1966);
N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1966, p. E-5, col. 1-!1.
1!15. POVERTY'S CHILDREN, A STUDY BY COMMUNICATING REsEARCH ON THE URBAN
POOR, sponsored by THE HEALTH AND WELFARE COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL
AREA. (1966).
1!16. Id. at 11.
1!17. Id. at 17.
1!18. Id. at 15.
1!19. For an explanation of how this figure is calculated, see notes 94-10!1 supra
and accompanying text.
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from the tenant's point of view. On the other hand, where the maximum, or more, is being expended on shelter, we would hold the
landlord liable, however irrational other expenditures might seem,
on the ground that, as to the landlord, the tenant is acting rationally.
The fact that a tenant may be depriving his family of food to indulge
his passion for the racetrack ought not to affect the landlord's obligations any more than would the fact that the tenant might beat his wife
or fall asleep on the job. Only where tenant conduct goes to the
ability of the landlord to fulfill his specific obligation may such a
defense properly be raised.
The foregoing proposal for synthesizing economic relations between tenant conduct and landlord defenses suggests in addition an
appropriate solution for those situations where it is urged that the
deteriorated condition of slum housing should be attributed to the
tenants, rather than to the landlord. Where the conditions upon
which a finding of indecency is predicated are attributable to tenant
conduct, rather than merely to landlord neglect, we believe a defense
should be available. For example, if, despite the landlord's effort to
make repairs in the plumbing, tenants continue to misuse the facilities, causing repeated breakdowns after such repairs, we would not
hold a landlord liable for finally giving up the effort. Similarly, if,
despite the supplying of adequate refuse collection facilities, tenants
continue to throw garbage in hallways and alleys, we would exculpate
the landlord. On the other hand, where the landlord can point to no
such mitigating circumstances, the action should lie.
Technically, this is what the law has always been, even in the context of code enforcement. But, in fact, the presence of tenant wrongdoing has either been ignored or has served to dilute the rigor with
which the codes have been enforced. We propose that the question of
tenant culpability be taken very seriously indeed, although we are
perfectly aware that such an approach is more easily proposed than
implemented. Not only are there difficult problems of proof to be
apprehended, but the presence of many tenants who have experienced little else but slum conditions, and the mores which those
"conditions create, suggests an organizational challenge of considerable proportions.
We nonetheless urge that the challenge be undertaken, not
because of any desire to make the tenant's opportunity to recover
more difficult, but out of conviction that essentially it is not help, but
self-help (made meaningful by opportunity), that is needed. The
traditional neighborhood improvement program, initiated from the
outside, has often failed not because it did not result in some physical
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improvement, but because it was carried out without effecting any
internal changes in the people involved.140 Paternalism of this sort,
presupposing the inadequacy of its beneficiaries, perpetuates the very
inequality sought to be overcome.141 Thus it is that one reads of the
effect of welfare programs:
Escape from poverty is not easy for American children raised in
families accustomed to living on relief. A recent sample study of
AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] recipients found
that more than 40 percent of the parents were themselves raised in
homes where public assistance had been received.142

In place of an image of inferiority externally imposed upon the
poor which then becomes self-fulfilling, the poor themselves must
"undertake social action that redefines them as potentially worthwhile and individually more powerful."143 This requires not only
that the poor be organized, but that the process of organization, if it
is to transform the "strength of the poor into the power of the
poor,"144 must come from the poor themselves. 145
This notion, that the potential for self-reliance has meaning only
if it is at some point transformed into power, into action which affects
the lives of those involved, is what ties the overall social problem into
the legal remedy sought here. For, just as welfare dispensed as a dole
from without is itself insufficient, so mere intellectual or spiritual
changes in self-image alone are meaningless unless at some point they
come to fruition in the form of results responsive to the needs of the
tenants. 146 The proposed civil damage action thus not only demands
much from slum inhabitants, but also holds out to them the concrete
promise of measurable social betterment because it aims "at the
140. Haagstrom, The Power of the Poor, in POVERTY IN AMERICA 315, 325 (Ferman,
Kornbluh & Haber eds. 1965).
141. Id. at 326; .ALINsKY, R.EvEn.LE FOR. RADICALS 68 (1946); Briar, Welfare From
Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 370, 384
(1966).
142. H. COMM, ON EDUC, AND LABOR., 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATFS 15 (Comm. Print 1964).
143. Haagstrom, supra note 140, at 332.
144. Reisman, Low Income Culture: The Strengths of the Poor, 26 J. OF MAR.R.IAGE
AND THE FAMILY 417 (1964).
145. Haagstrom, supra note 140, at 332. Lest it be thought that we are disregarding our own advice by telling the poor what they need, we abjure all claim to
originality and point, as an example, to the definition of Black Power given by its
proponents: Control by the affected group over that upon which they are dependent.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1966, p. 10, cols. 2-8; Sanders, The Language of Watts, 201
THE NATION 490-93 (1965).
146. Coles, The Poor Don't Want To Be Middle Class, in CALIF. STATE DEP'T OF
SOCIAL WELFARE, SELECTIVE READING SERIES No. 7, at 8 (1965); Haagstrom, supra note
140, at 332.
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destruction of slums, their causes and effects;"147 it is an appropriate
remedy because its "goal [is] genuine self-help, not pierely self-improvement."148
IV. SETTING THE STANDARD
Setting the standard of unlawful conduct requires the identification of those housing conditions so at odds with our concept of the
essential decencies of life that we believe no American ought to be
subjected to them at the hands of another. Naturally there are no
absolutely fixed stars in this constellation. Many writers have noted
that, in different places and at different times, the notions of minimal
decencies have been widely divergent; 149 thus it may be pointed out
not only that in some places people live with placidity, if not enthusiastic fervor, in thatch huts, but also that even in the United
States indoor plumbing is rather a recent innovation. While this is
indisputable, the lesson which is meant to be drawn therefrom is
unclear. It is equally true that the abolition of human slavery is a
relatively modem innovation, here as elsewhere, but today we would
hardly need the thirteenth amendment to persuade us that involuntary servitude is an outrage intolerable in our present society. The
question is not whether our standards have timelessness and universality, but simply what our standards are. We are hardly less capable
of asking ourselves what the outer limits on landlord conduct should
be than we are of asking that question with respect to bill collectors,
undertakers, policemen, or voting registrars.
While we have neither the benefits of a written constitution nor
the usual historical precedents to guide us, we are by no means left
wholly at large. Fortunately, the widespread adoption of housing
codes by American cities150 provides an excellent starting point in
formulating a standard. Their identification of various housing conditions as unacceptable and illegal serves us both in the sense that it
puts any landlord on notice of the kind of conduct which may be
challenged, and in that it represents a legislative judgment as to the
points at which economic preservation of the landlord is deemed to
be outweighed by concern for the living conditions of the tenant. At
the same time, the housing codes quite clearly bring together a great
. 147. Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement,
in POVERTY IN AMERICA 457,462 (Ferman, Kombluh & Haber eds. 1965).
148. Ibid.
149. E.g., BANFIELD & GRODZINS, GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN AREA$
78 (1958); FISHER, 20 YEARS OF PUBUC HOUSING 29-31, 52-53 (1959).
150. 27 MUNICIPAL YEAR BooK 318-28 (1960); Comment, Enforcement of Municipal
Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 803 (1965).
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variety of violations of widely differing importance, including not
only the very grave wrongs but also a good many quite minor infractions.151 While it would be a serious mistake to treat every violation of the housing codes as a tort for which substantial damages
ought to lie, the housing codes do serve the important function of
delineating the outer limits of wrongful conduct. Thus it may be
said, as a first step, that no act which is not a violation of the housing
code may be tortious.
This first step circumscribes the scope of our inquiry. The second
step requires selecting from the codes those violations which are of
sufficient gravity that failure to comply with them can be viewed as
outrageous and thus tortious. At this point, too, we have considerable
guidance; for a great number of studies of housing conditions, from
the Census surveys to investigations by governmental agencies, private
institutions, and individuals, despite their divergences on many
issues, are quite consistent in identifying those basic conditions which
reduce a dwelling to the level of indecency. These conditions are:
I. Structural Dilapidation: This is usually understood to include
substantial openings, decay, listing, or sagging in foundations, walls,
ceilings, stairways, halls, and floors of such a nature as to present a
serious danger of injury or exposure. It also covers structures which
by their nature are unfit for human habitation, such as huts or shacks
made of scrap, with dirt floors or without foundations. 152
2. Absence or Inadequacy of Basic Facilities: This means the
absence of hot and cold running water, flush toilet, and bath or
shower within each unit for the exclusive use of the occupants
thereof. 153 It includes, notwithstanding the presence of such facilities
and basic heating, cooking, and electrical apparatus, the maintenance
of these facilities and devices in a condition such that they cannot be
151. In addition to the customary provisions requiring the presence of basic facilities
such as toilets, plumbing, and heating, one may find a requirement that apartment
elevators contain a sign stating the rated carrying capacity, or that bathrooms must be
accessible from any sleeping room without passing through any other sleeping room.
Such typical variety is illustrated by the NEW YoRK STATE MODEL HousING CoDE
§§ A·207-2b, A-513b (Division of Housing and Community Renewal 1960).
152. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS' MODEL MINIMUM HOUSING
STANDARDS ORDINANCE § 12-606 (1962) [hereinafter cited as NIMLO HOUSING ORDINANCE];
SIEGEL &: BROOKS, SLUM PREVENTION THROUGH CONSERVATION AND REHABILITATION 98
(1953); U.S. CENSUS OF HOUSING 1960, vol. 1, States and Small Areas, Part 6 XXI-XXII.
153. NIMLO HOUSING ORDINANCE § 12-603; NEW YORK CITY RENT AND REHABILITATION ADMINIS'I'RATION, op. cit. supra note 107, at 29; SCHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY 31, 123 (U.S. Dep't H.E.W., Social Security Admin., Div. of Research and
Statistics Research Report No. 1, 1963); SIEGEL &: BROOKS, op. cit. supra note 152, at 19.
In some circumstances, the sharing of a bathroom by tenants in quite small units may
be permissible. E.g., CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 78-13.1, .4.
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depended upon to give adequate service on a regular basis. 154 A heating plant or plumbing facility which is so old or deteriorated that it is
incessantly breaking down, leaving the tenants without service for
substantial or frequent periods, would exemplify such an inadequacy.
3. Absence of Rudimentary Sanitary Services: This means principally infestation of vermin or rodents, accumulation of filth in
common areas, or failure to provide adequate facilities for the disposal of trash and garbage.155
4. Severe Crowding: Overcrowding is usually measured in mathematical terms, on the basis either of persons per room,156 or of cubic
feet of air and floor space per individual. 157 While these standards are
undoubtedly useful in general, they ought not to be employed with
unbending rigor. Obviously a room-person ratio is less than fully
helpful unless the size and nature of the rooms are taken into account.
Similarly, a space-person ratio would undoubtedly be subject to some
marginal diminution as family size increases; a six-person family
probably does not need fifty per cent more space than does a fourperson family in order to be equally uncrowded. Underlying each of
these tests is an attempt to determine both the limits of healthful and
sanitary living and the minimum amenities of privacy. Thus, in addition to the numerical criteria, it would be relevant to determine
whether bathroom and kitchen facilities are contained within the
same room, whether there are sleeping quarters for adults separate
from those for children, and whether there is some room in the
dwelling not required as a sleeping room which permits opportunity
for privacy anu study.
One further comment is required as to the problem of overcrowding. Conceivably a defendant landlord would argue that overcrowding, unlike failure to provide services, does not represent a
profit-motivated imposition in that he may have a fixed price for a
given apartment and is indifferent whether that apartment is
occupied by two or twenty people. Indeed, he may urge that he
would rather have it occupied by a smaller family, for crowding is
undesirable to him in that it puts further strain on his building's
facilities without producing any additional rental income. Such a
defense suggests its own rebuttal: If rents are not determined by
154. Ibid.
155. NIMLO HousING ORDINANCE § 12-603; N.Y. Times, July 19, 1966, p. 1, col. 2.
156. NEW YORK CITY RENT AND REHABn.rrATION .ADMINISTRATION, op. cit. supra note
107, at 6; SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 153, at 122-23.
157. Wall, Developments in Municipal Housing Codes, 42 Ptrauc MANAGEMENT
107-08 (1960); see, e.g., CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE§ 78-16.l; NIMLO HOUSING ORDINANCE
§§ 12-604, -605; NEW YORK STATE MODEL HOUSING CoDE § A-203; SIEGEL 8: BROOKS,
op. cit. supra note 152, at 19.
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density of occupation, why do slum landlords rent very small apartments to very large families? The answer is that this is the only
market, by and large, which they can serve. Small low-income families
do not face anything like the critical shortage facing the large
poor family; 158 the small family can frequently satisfy its housing
needs in standard, or only mildly substandard, dwellings. 159 That
they do not provide the principal market for seriously substandard housing is demonstrated by the extremely high correlation
between severely run-down housing and severe overcrowding.160
Thus, for the owner of very bad housing, the choice is between
vacancies and overcrowding. Because he chooses to acquiesce in overcrowding, his decision is profit motivated just as surely as is his failure
to make necessary repairs.161 To note that he faces the prospect of
vacancies does not, however, suggest that he also faces a situation of
excess supply which would diminish his essentially monopolistic
position, the relevance of which was discussed above; 162 for, although
he may operate principally in the limited large-family low-income
market, the supply of housing for this restricted group is critically
short. Consequently the slum landlord who permits overcrowding
may fairly be viewed as just as culpable, in the sense of making a
profit-motivated decision which is imposed upon consumers in an
intense shortage situation, as is the landlord who refuses to install
or repair basic facilities.
While the four basic wrongs just delineated should be viewed as
neither exhaustive nor precisely descriptive, they are at least as sufficient as the tests used in determining the reasonableness of detention in a false imprisonment case,163 or the outrageousness of a bill
collector's tactics. 164 Moreover, the individual standards are mutually
158. COMMUNITY RENEWAL PROGRAM, CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK'S RENEWAL
STRATEGY/1965, at 36 (1965).
159. GREENBERG, CHARACTElUSTICS OF Low INCOME AND BADLY HOUSED HOUSEHOLDS
IN THE PHILADELPHIA REGION 6 (Working Paper No. 8, Phila. Housing Ass'n Policy
Comm., May 1964).
160. GLAZER &: McENTIRE, Snroms IN HOUSING AND MINORITY GROUPS 158-59 (1960);
MEYERSON, TERRE'IT &: WHEATON, HOUSING, PEOPLE AND CITIES 58 (1962); NEW YORK
CITY SUBCOMMI'ITEE ON HOUSING STA11STICS, MAYOR'S HOUSING EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
HOUSING 5TA11STICS HANDBOOK 35 (Oct. 1964); SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 153, at 85-86.
161. GLAZER &: McENTIRE, op. cit. supra note 160, at 168, 173. Though codes may
impose responsibility for overcrowding on both landlords and tenants, e.g., CHICAGO
MUNICIPAL CoDE §§ 78-13, -16, where tenant overcrowding is the involuntary product
of economic necessity, cf. notes 94-ll6 supra and accompanying text, no legal disability
ought to follow for the tenant. Conversely, a landlord defense may be available where
the tenant is subletting to strangers for a profit.
162. See notes 104-15 supra and accompanying text.
163. PROSSER, TORTS § 22, at 124 (3d ed. 1964).
164. Id. § II, at 49-50.
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reinforcing because dilapidated buildings will also generally be those
without rudimentary facilities or services. In this sense, too, the cases
may be expected to resemble the bill collector situation, where it is
the cumulative impact of a variety of undesirable practices taken
together that persuades a court that an actionable wrong has
occurred.166
Moreover, we can be reasonably confident that truly deplorable
housing will be sufficiently shocking to the sensibilities of judges and
juries that they will recognize indecency when they see it, 166 and that,
in the words of the Restatement, "recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' " 167 Such
confidence is enhanced by the word pictures so often given by those
who write about the slums. Of the many such examples available,
perhaps a single illustration will suffice to indicate the impact to be
expected on the average member of the community:
In this six-story building, converted into furnished rooms, filth
prevails throughout-filled garbage cans without covers line the hallways with the surplus refuse spilling over; roaches and rats abound;
broken flooring, plumbing, windows, lighting fixtures and plaster
are observable throughout .... One community kitchen is used by
seven families. Twelve toilets are intermittently in service on six
floors . . . . This is the abode of thirty families and 105 children ....1as

It is for subjection to such conditions that relief is sought. Of
course, as has been made clear,169 it is only the imposition of these
conditions by the landlord which is to be redressed, and an appropriate showing of non-culpability by the plaintiff tenants will be
required. Moreover, there is no desire to reach the merely inadvertant
landlord whose facilities are out of repair but who has not had adequate notice or a proper opportunity to respond to complaints. While
notice, actual or constructive knowledge, and opportunity are thus all
elements of the wrong, it seems appropriate to let the precise nature
165. E.g., Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) (persistent
course of harrassment by bill collector). Occasionally a building will lack one very vital
facility. Nonetheless, unless the building as a whole is one in which living conditions
are indecent as one commonly uses that term in describing the more egregious slum
conditions, no cause of action should be recognized. For example, tenants of a middle
income apartmentthouse which lacks a fire escape, though it is otherwise quite a
pleasant place to live, would not be able to sue under this proposal.
166. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
167. REs'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d at 73 (1965).
168. SCHORR, op. cit. supra note 153, at 123-24.
169. See sections II &: Ill supra.
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of the proof which is required of these elements be resolved within
the factual situation of a given case.
V.

MEASURING THE WRONG: WHEN THE CAUSE OF ACTION
ARlsES AND THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES

Because the kind of conduct at issue here produces consequences
which are both long-term and difficult to discern, and which reveal
their meaning only in a milieu which contains many actors and many
victims, the cause of action cannot be said to arise when the wrongful
conduct is completed, as it would in the conventional case. Rather,
as in the constitutional or antitrust merger cases, it is the initial act
which sets the law in motion. Only in this way can the wrong be
remedied before the very thing which the law seeks to prevent has
occurred. Thus it is the act of renting or of maintaining indecent
housing which gives rise to the right of redress.170
Lest it be thought that this approach unjustifiably opens the way
for people to buy themselves a lawsuit for the price of a month's rent,
let it be remembered who the potential plaintiffs in such lawsuits are:
They are people who are expending the maximum feasible portion of
their income on rent and who still find themselves living in deplorably bad housing. They are thus the very poor who, for all the reasons
discussed earlier, are simply the takers of what they can get. The
whole point of this article is that, where all they can get is indecent
housing, they are entitled to get a lawsuit along with it. 171
Nor should it be a cause for concern that a particular individual
could conceivably be a plaintiff in more than one lawsuit against
various defendants who have been his landlords at different times.
While this is hardly likely to be a problem of significant proportion
in light of the organizational demands imposed by our view of the
tenant culpability defense, 172 the possibility of multiple lawsuits, far
from being an obstacle, is perfectly consistent with the underlying
theory of this article. For, as the earlier discussion shows, it is the
170. This is not intended to contravene the earlier statements that tenant recovery
depends upon a showing of adequate knowledge and notice, and that recovery may be
had only when the tenants have not caused ,the harm. To get to this stage will sometimes require the passage of a period of time after the start of the tenancy. The only
point sought to be made here is that the arising of the cause of action should not
depend upon the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate the presence of traditional tort type
damage. This is merely to put in a technical context the point made in section II supra.
171. The Supreme Court has before it this term a related issue. In Pierson v. Ray,
ll52 F.2d 2lll (5th Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 938 (1966), the question is whether
persons on a civil rights pilgrimage who invite and endure arrest, are barred from
subsequently maintaining a Civil Rights Act damage action. See also West Park Ave.,
Inc. v. Ocean Township, 48 N.J. 122,224 A.2d 1 (1966).
172. See text accompanying notes 139-48 supra.
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parallel conduct of landlords in the market available to the tenant
which makes the slum-housing problem so serious; it is the totality of
conduct of all the enterprisers which puts the tenant in his unfortunate position, just as in the antitrust or racial discrimination context
it is the pattern of conduct in the industry or community which comprises the total fabric of wrongfulness. Each landlord who, when
given the chance, imposes intolerable living conditions contributes something to the gravity of the damage inflicted on his tenant.
Therefore, the fact that a tenant could bring suits against more than
one landlord would expedite the remedying of the totality of wrongfulness which operates against the tenant.
This is simply another way of saying that one should not view the
right to be free from subjection to indecent housing as a monolithic
right which can be infringed but once by a single person; it is rather
a right to be free of such treatment by all potential violators, and
the magnitude of potential damage is as large as the class of potential
violators. That inchoate right in all its multiplicity is infringed as
often as the wrongful practices occur. Such an approach is most commonly found in the racial discrimination area, where civil damages
are recoverable for each violation of a public accommodation law. It
is perfectly possible for an individual to seek service at various times
in various restaurants or hotels and to recover damages for each
refusal. 173 Because the degree of harmfulness of discrimination is
proportional to the prevalence of discriminatory conduct in the
community, each instance is viewed as a separate wrong to be
remedied separately. The right is not exhausted by a single act of
exclusion.
Moreover, it must be remembered that the damages to be recovered in such a case, as in the ordinary intentional infliction litigation, contain substantial deterrent, as well as punitive and vindicatory, elements. From this perspective, attention is properly focused
on the fact that various defendants, each of whom needs to be reminded forcibly that his conduct will not be tolerated, are being
given the sort of treatment they deserve. That one plaintiff may reap
the economic benefits of.this educational lesson to the landlords need
not deter us here any more than it does in any of the various situations where punitive damages are granted or where the promotion of
justice is entrusted to private vindicators of the public interest.174
The theoretical prospect that multiple suits would lead to the vast
enrichment of certain former slum tenants is sufficiently remote that
it need hardly worry us. Such fears are perhaps best likened to the
173. E.g., N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW§ 41.
174. E.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545-56 (1943).
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complaint that "discrimination in reverse" is permitting the Negroes
to take over the country, but none of whose proponents has yet
yearned to become a Negro and get in on the great bonanza.
As to the measure of damages, it is of course clear that here-as in
a voting rights case-there is no economic interest as such at stake.
Since the damages serve a significant deterrent and punitive function, it might be appropriate to follow the rule of Alcorn v. Mitchell,175 where the court, in affirming an award of $1,000, looked at the
wealth of the defendant and asked whether the damages granted
would make clear to the defendant that gratifying his malignant
instincts was a painfully costly enterprise. Another possibility, and
one more attuned to the remedial aspects of the case, would be to
grant the plaintiff some multiple of the amount needed to purchase
standard housing for his family for a year. Since the gravamen of
defendant's wrong is subjection of the plaintiff to the disabilities
attendant upon living in substandard housing, it would seem just
to require the defendant to enable the plaintiff to obtain the benefits of standard housing for some period of time, perhaps five years.
This approach has a further appeal: Since the prospect of contracting the low-cost housing supply has been a serious impediment
to effective code enforcement, nothing could be more appropriate
than to have the guilty landlord himself mitigate this problem.176
During this period, it must be expected that legislatures, spurred
by judicial recognition of the tort action proposed herein, will
move to ameliorate the problem.
VI.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRADITIONAL LANDLORD
AND TENANT

LAw

Although the antiquated law of landlord and tenant still imposes
a number of disabilities on lessees in both contract and tort actions,m
fortunately none of these disabilities operates as an impediment to
175. 63 Ill. 553 (1872).
176. The fact that many slum buildings are held in corporate form with quite
limited assets should not-but probably will-be an obstacle to reaching the controlling stockholders in the damage action proposed here. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 35
U.SL. Week 2330-31 (N.Y. 1966). Compare BAKER &: CARY, CAsEs ON CORPORATIONS 37576 (3d ed. 1959); LA1TY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFrn.lA.TED CORPORATIONS 77-90 (1936). New
York has made an attempt to mitigate this problem by statute. See N.Y. Times, May 18,
1966, p. 36, col. 4. Perhaps, though, corporate ownership is less widespread than has
commonly been supposed. S1ERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 121-22 (1966).
177. PROSSER, TORTS § 63, at 411-13 (3d ed. 1964); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 355-56 (1965); Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard
Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 310-11 (1965). A recent discussion of the problem from
a contract perspective is Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for
Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519 (1966); see also LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING llEsEARCH FUND OF
COLUMJIIA UNIVERSITY, LEGAL REMEDIES IN HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT IN NEW You
CITY 127-81 (1965).
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the action proposed herein. Even where the old tort rules still apply,
relieving the landlord of any duty in regard to the condition of
the leased premises, there are exceptions for those parts of the
premises over which the lessor retains control.178 The usual examples given to describe these exceptions, such as common stairways,
roofs, yards, walls, foundation, heating, lighting, or plumbing, 179 include virtually all the facilities that are going to be in issue in any
of the cases envisioned here. Moreover, many courts are now committed to the principle that, where a tort action is premised upon
violation of a housing code, the duty legislatively imposed upon the
landlord abrogates any no-duty defense which the landlord might
have had at common law.180 These cases are also most useful in that
they dispel any claims that the statutory remedy is to be treated as
the exclusive means of redress for conduct which constitutes a violation of the housing codes. 181
A lease with a clause exculpating the landlord from tort liability
also would be of no avail to the defendant. Though such clauses are
generally valid in negligence cases, exculpation from liability for
intentional torts is prohibited.182 In addition, there are now a number of statutes rendering such clauses void,183 as well as common
law rules voiding contracts in contravention of statutory duties.18'
Moreover, it should be clear, on the basis of the previous discussion,
that an exculpatory clause in a slum lease would be a most appropriate situation for the application of the general doctrine invalidating such provisions when contained in adhesion contracts
dealing with necessary services.1815
178. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS §§ 360, 361 (1965).
179. Ibid.
180. PROSSER., TORTS § 63, at 413 n.25 (3d ed. 1964). See also Whetzel v. Jess Fisher
Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Hanna v. Lederman, 223 Cal. App. 2d
786, 36 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1963); McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260
(1961); Saracino v. Capital Properties Associates, 50 N.J. Super. 81, 141 A.2d 71 (Super.
Ct. 1958); Altz v. Lieberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. '703 (1922).
181. It is not urged here that the statute creates the plaintiff's right; rather, the
statutory standards are mere guidelines for the right which should be recognized at
common law. The cases simply stand for the proposition that the presence of a
statutory remedy does not pre-empt a common law action. Odom v. East Ave. Corp.,
178 Misc. 363, 34 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
182. Kuzmiak v• .Brookchester, 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (Super. Ct. 1955); 6A
CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 1472, at 596-97, 601-02 (1962).
183. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 15a (1966); N.Y. GEN.
OBUGATIONS LAW§ 5-321; see Hanna v. Lederman, 223 Cal. App. 2d 786, 36 Cal. Rptr.
150 (1963); Boyd v. Smith, 372 Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953).
184. Schoshinski, supra note 177, at 537-38.
185. Comment, Contractual Exculpation From Tort Liability in California-The
"True Rule" Steps Forward, 52 CAuF. L. REv. 350 (1964). On the same principle, the
notorious .Bond-For-Deed arrangements, by which the landlord seeks to shift the
statutory burden by a form of "sale," is ripe for some judicial reordering. See !LuNOIS
GENERAL A.5SEMBLY, Rfil>oRT OF THE COMMnTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON
SLUM HOUSING AND RENT GoUGING 3 (1965).

March 1967]

Slumlordism

915

VII. THE FUNCTION AND FUTURE OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
One of the few things about which every observer of the slum
housing situation agrees is that present enforcement techniques have
been a failure. 186 The combination of bureaucratic overlapping and
understaffing, the use of procedural delays to the advantage of recalcitrant landlords, and the lack of militancy by both administrative and judicial officials, have all worked against the achieving
of significant change.187 The more routine proposals for reformsuch as administrative consolidation188 or the enlargement of fines189
-are not without their usefulness, but one can hardly bring himself
to believe that yet another round of legislative manipulation of the
old strategies is going to induce needed changes while the same
actors, with the same attitudes, remain to implement the high hopes
which are reflected in each such new proposal.
The more imaginative new ideas--such as the rent strike,100 the
tenants' union, 191 receivership in its various forms, 192 and rent abatement193 or withholding194-are all relatively untested, and thus less
amenable to pessimism. Nonetheless, as indicated earlier, because
they all share the common assumption that the landlord can be
whipped into line by the exertion of financial pressure, their prospects for success raise some serious questions.
Insofar as these schemes deny the landlord the funds which would
ordinarily be used for repairs, they are in a sense self-defeating, and
186. E.g., Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66
CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 276-79 (1966); Comment, Rent Witholding and the Improvement
of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 314-23 (1965); Comment, Enforcement
of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 801, 826, 830, 859 (1965); Comment,
Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conservation of Chicago's Housing Supply, 31
U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 180 (1963). Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and
Remedies, 66 CoLuM. L. REv. 1254 (1966), defend past achievements more than most
commentators, but their study too is ultimately a history of failure.
187. See authorities cited supra note 186.
188. E.g., LEGISLATIVE DR.AFTING REsEAR.CH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, ADMINISTRATIVE CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSING ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
(Dec. 31, 1964); Detroit Free Press, Aug. 17, 1966, p. 3, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 15, 1966,
p. 44, col. 3.
189. E.g., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING REsEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, op. cit.
supra note 187, at 67-86; Gribetz &: Grad, supra note 186.
190. See Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard
Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304 (1965).
191. Hillman, Tenant Unions in the Common Law, unpublished paper prepared
for the Conference on the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, University of Chicago Law
School, Nov. 1966.
192. See Gribetz, New York City's Receivership Law, 21 J. HOUSING 297 (1964);
Levi, supra note 186; Detroit Free Press, Aug. 17, 1966, p. 1, col. 1. The receivership
program in New York City has just been "scuttled" by the administration. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 14, 1967, p. 33, col. 8.
193. N.Y. MOLT. DWELL. LAw § 302a.
194. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW § 755; N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAw § 143b; Pa. Laws
1965, Act No. 534, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1.
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thus tend to intensify the very problem they are designed to solve.195
The hope, of course, is that the expenditure of money for needed
repairs will be less costly to the landlord than the abandonment of
his rents. 196 Where this is the case and the tenants seek only relatively
minor repairs or maintenance, the tenants' union or rent strike can
be effective. However, the focus of our concern is the seriously
deteriorated building, because it is there that the problems are most
intense. With such properties, the landlord is able to succeed economically only if he can "milk" the property, taking his rents while
he lets the building deteriorate and stays a step ahead of code enforcement sanctions.197 Unless a landlord can afford to effect the
repairs demanded and still make an acceptable profit, the hoped
for economic incentive cannot operate, and the rational decision
for him will be to abandon the building or sell it at a greatly depressed price to one who can afford to make enough repairs to
get rents reinstated and still make a profit on the operation.
Where the cost of adequate repairs exceeds the prospect of continuing profits, the tenants are the losers when abandonment occurs.
Even where there is a sale at a diminished price, the prospects do
not seem to be much better. Those who buy in such situations are
necessarily the most speculative of speculators, and their success often
turns on their political abilities rather than on their ability to provide real services to the tenants. Thus, they are likely to make only
the minimum improvements which are required to get rents reinstated.198 Another technique of evasion involves a sale by a small
operator to an owner of many properties. The buyer begins to rehabilitate one property, putting his others on a list for future improvement, thus making a showing of good faith. 199 In this manner,
he may induce sympathetic treatment by public authorities on the
195. One of the new rent abatement laws obviates this aspect of the problem by
permitting rents to be deposited in court and utilized for repairs. N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTIONS LAW § 771.
196. Another problem is raised by the ability of the landlord to take reprisals,
in the form of eviction, or to outlast the tenants by legal delays which favor him. As
to the latter problem, see the six month waiting provision in N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. I.Aw
§ 302a. There are some legal restrictions on evictions. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 71
(1966); MASS, GEN. LAWS ANN. cb. 239, § 9 (1956); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 756.
See also Edwards v. Habib, 366 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Schoshinski, supra note 177,
at 541-52.
197. E.g., :KLEIN, LET IN THE SuN (1963); Comment, Rent Withholding and the
Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 321 n.83 (1965); Dahl,
A White Slumlord Confesses, Esquire, July 1966, p. 92.
198. !LUNOIS GENERAL AssEMBLY, supra note 185, at 5. See also N.Y. Times, Sept.
6, 1966, p. 43, col. 3.
199. NASH, REslDENTIAL REHABIUTATION: PRIVATE PROFITS AND Puuuc PURPOSES 11112 (1959). Such buyers have been known to make some improvements, however. MEYER·
SON, TERRETT & WHEATON, HOUSING, PEOPLE AND CITIES 190 (1962).
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ground that he is doing the best he can, since it is obvious that he
cannot do everything at once. To the extent that such schemes produce only minimal work or indefinite delay, the momentum of enforcement diminishes and the tenant is essentially back in his old
position. If these schemes are to be foiled, it can only be by the most
pertinacious and rigorous enforcement by public officials, which is
the one thing we have never had.
Receivership proposals are designed to eliminate one aspect of
the problem just discussed by taking the decision whether to repair
out of the hands of the landlord and putting it into those of a public
official. While this is in one sense an improvement, a moment's reflection will reveal that a fundamental difficulty is intensified rather than
solved by such an arrangement. As the proponents of receivership
schemes recognize, in order to effect a substantial amount of repair, it
is frequently necessary to apply not only that portion of the rents
which represents the owner's profit, but in addition at least that
amount which would have gone to a mortgagee in the form of
monthly payments of principal and interest.200 To do this, it is
necessary to subordinate the mortgagee's claim to that of the receiver, thus imposing on the mortgagee the same financial pressures
which are put on the landlord. Moreover, this financial loss is likely
to persist for a very long time.201 Although this development has been
said to be desirable in the sense that it broadens the responsibility for
slum housing,202 it seems rather that it might have the opposite effect.
For such a scheme makes the financial community the involuntary
ally of the slum landlord. Since a basic impediment to effective code
enforcement has always been reached at the point where the landlord's economic interest was truly jeopardized, it is difficult to understand how enforcement is going to be aided by enlarging the investor
class thus threatened. The more likely result is an increase of political pressure against code enforcement. Perhaps the financial community has a hidden altruism yet to be revealed, but one can hardly
be blamed for having his doubts. 203
200. Levi, supra note 186, at 280.
201. Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing,
53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 321 (1965).
202. Levi, supra note 186, at 280.
203. While it is true that the receivership law has been upheld in New York, so
that a mortgagee's lien on rents, but only rents, is subordinated to the receiver, in
the Matter of Dep't of .Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964),
the real question is not what the courts do in upholding or rejecting the constitutionality of such laws, but how extensively public officials will utilize their leg'!ll power
in the many thousands of cases in which the receivership law might be applicable. See
note 208 infra.
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One suggestion which has been made, perhaps partly in recognition of these disabilities, is that rehabilitation money should be
loaned for use by receivers. 204 However, by now it is eminently clear
that ordinary commercial loans to rehabilitate very low-cost housing are not acceptable investments; the inadequate rent base which
has prevented new private low-cost housing from being built presents
substantially the same problem with respect to rehabilitation. 205 Even
to the extent that rehabilitation can be cheaper than new building,200
any substantial new investment will lead to considerable rent increases,207 the result of which will be to drive out the people for
whom the program is designed. And unless rents are raised there will
be no source from which the loan can be repaid.
Loans for rehabilitation could be privately obtained only if the
result were the ousting of the existing tenants, which we do not want,
or if the lender's claims were to be given priority over the claims
of the landlord and present mortgagee, which priorities would lead
to the problem discussed above. Thus, any such loans must come
from public funds as a subsidy, and it must be a subsidy of very
substantial proportions in order to do the job in the magnitude
which is needed. But, if we could have the amount of money we
need, we could have already met the problem at issue through public
housing, rent subsidies, or some other such program. It is precisely
the unwillingness of legislatures to make the huge expenditures
required to bring great masses of deteriorated housing up to standard
by replacement or rehabilitation that has left us, a generation after
the institution of the public housing program, in the deplorable
state that presently exists. It is most difficult to see why any mere
change of format is going to set the stage for that economic reallocation which thirty years of continued misery has not brought about.
Some confirmation of the doubts raised above is provided by the fact
that New York City reportedly has already "scuttled the receivership program" as a failure. 208
204. Levi, supra note 186, at 280.
205. Note 20 supra; N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1966, p. 43, cols. 3-4.
206. The Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
207. This is the unvarying pattern. MILLSPAUGH &: BRECKENFELD, THE HUMAN SIDE
OF URBAN RENEWAL 108, 110 (1960); NASH, op. cit. supra note 199, at 94, 186-87. Unless
rents are controlled, there is no way to prevent the landlord from raising them, and
if rents are held down on the theory that the landlord should absorb the loss out of
his "excessive" profits, we are back to the same economic pressures discussed above.
It must be remembered that while slum profits may be excessive in relation to other
investments, it is undoubtedly the prospect of a larger than usual return which induces
investment in such problem properties. Thus the reduction of slum housing profits to
a level equal to that available in high grade stocks or bonds would surely produce a
very severe market crisis.
208. N.Y. Times, Jan, 14, 1967, p. 33, col. 8.

March 1967]

Slumlordism

919

Nonetheless, the receivership programs are most intriguing in one
respect. Quite clearly underlying such proposals is a recognition that,
for an extremely long time, neither the landlord nor his financiers
are going to be able to recover a profit on their investment. Indeed,
it seems reasonable to assume that a truly large-scale receivership program would shatter the market in slum properties beyond recovery.
Inherent in the receivership idea, then, is a most fundamental point,
which lies at the very heart of this article. It is simply this: Providing
adequate housing for very low-income people is not a business which
can offer investors the kind of profit which so arduous an enterprise
must entail. While this is not the sort of conclusion which can be
rigorously demonstrated, it is one which inevitably must be drawn
from the history described in this article: The failure of private
investors to build new housing for the poor, the consistent inadequacy of code enforcement, and the rise in rentals attendant upon
major rehabilitation, all indicate that it is economics-and not lack
of good faith or good laws-which has been the primary obstacle.209
The present status of receiverships is eloquent confirmation of this
fact. For the great majority of buildings taken over will either "never
pay for themselves ... [or] do so only over a long period of time." 210
Thus any widespread use of the receivership becomes an indirect
form of public subsidy, with taxpayers financing the rehabilitation
of seriously deteriorated buildings. Far from showing that decent
housing can be provided by the private market, receiverships demonstrate exactly the opposite. It is time that we recognized the significance of all this evidence, rather than continuing our dalliance with
the thought that if only enough economic pressure is brought to bear,
landlords will fall into line, buildings will be improved, tenants will
be happy, and owners will continue to make a reasonable profit.
This means that we must put the initiative in the tenants, who
are most immune to the political pressure that a genuine program
will necessarily generate; it means that we must look to the courts
to deal the death blow, for they are the institution in society
most receptive to such claims; 211 and we must do all this in a way
that imposes the least dislocation on the tenants and produces the
most effective pressure on the legislatures to respond to the need
thus manifested.
209. What evidence we have is inevitably indirect or informal. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1966, p. 46, col. 5.
210. Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing,
58 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 321 n.83 (1965).
211. The recent willingness of the New York Court of Appeals to uphold the
constitutionality of the subordination provision of their receivership law is indicative.
See note 203 supra.
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Of course no such severe prospect can be painless. But it is hoped
that the proposal urged in this article can mitigate the pain and
at the same time have a greater hope of success than others which
have thus far been advanced. Our reasons for so thinking are several.
First, the placing of the decision to go forward in the tenant class
should itself mitigate the moral problem of imposing on another
the risk of serious sacrifice. Second, such a proposal should be selfstrengthening in the sense that once one decides for himself to take
a great step he readies himself psychologically for the physical sacrifices which that step involves. We see this most dramatically in the
revolutionary who, having made the decision to seize his freedom,
endures unblinkingly what to any other person would be the most
unbearable suffering.212 Since the proposed cause of action emphasizes very significantly the need for tenant non-culpability, we may
assume that the initiation of such actions will require considerable
community organizing213 and the development of a group esprit
which will promote readiness to endure, for the iterim, the necessary sacrifices. Third, the prospect of recovering substantial civil
damages should itself provide both an incentive which has thus far
been largely lacking and a softening of the consequences to be anticipated from intensifying pressure upon the existing inadequate housing supply.
Finally, the prosecution of a successful civil damage action, as
we propose it, will not be easy, and it is not likely that a vast number
of landlords will be attacked simultaneously or will be successfully
sued in a very brief period. Thus it is to be hoped that the slumhousing market can be brought to its knees relatively gradually, so
that the legislatures may have some time to act before a great many
landlords are immediately threatened. Because of this, it may be
212. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1962). The success achieved in organizing tenant unions provides some hopeful evidence that the job can be done. See the
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 16, 1966, p. I, col. I. Mr. Gilbert Cornfield, a Chicago lawyer,
has also reported that, once tenants committed themselves to a tenant union, experience
showed that they moved ahead undeterred by fears of eviction or other retaliatory
action by landlords. Conference on the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, University of
Chicago Law School, Nov. 17, 1966. Nonetheless, we are acutely aware of the difficulties
presented by a program in which anticipated benefits are rather remote and in which
a great deal of legal service will be required. See Comment, Federal Aids for Enforcement of Housing Codes, 40 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 948 (1965). Hopefully some will see that the
ultimate benefits to be derived from such a legal breakthrough are worth considerable
sacrifice and effort.
213. The likelihood is that civil rights and community organizations will play an
active role in developing awareness of the possibilities and demands of instituting such
an action. Insofar as they are representative of the community, and insofar as their
ability to succeed turns upon effective mobilization of the community, the decision to
go forward will be representative rather than uniquely individual.
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anticipated that the process of breakdown will be mitigated by the
entry of speculators who, hoping the worst will not happen, will to
some extent buoy up the market before the worst does in fact happen.

Conclusion
We do not desire to back away from the charge that in many ways
ours is a radical proposal. In a certain sense we are asking the courts
to recognize a new tort or at the least a very much altered form of
a traditional tort. Moreover, we are asking them to implement
a policy decision of primary significance in society, one that will
ultimately cost a great deal of money and may require the putting
aside, at least temporarily, of other important matters.
Of course there are those who will ask: Is this a proper function
of the judiciary? In turning, finally, to this question, it ought to be
noted that this would not be the first time that courts have created
new rights which have had a major impact on society. In tort
law alone, significant judicial innovations with respect to privacy,
privity, products liability, and, indeed, the intentional infliction tort
itself, come immediately to mind.
Perhaps, however, the question can properly be answered only
with another question. If there are laws on the books (as there are
in plenitude) and if we all agree that they state a basic and desirable
social goal, are the courts fulfilling their proper role only so long
as those laws remain ineffective? Only so long as their decisions cannot achieve great results? Only so long as they do not endanger important interests in society? If the "proper" role of the courts
is thus limited, the courts are not a truly co-equal branch of government. No one is asking them to contravene standards which
the legislatures have adopted, and which executive branch officials
have time and again asserted; they are only being asked to enforce
those standards. If the legislatures have not meant what they have
said, let the courts make them end the verbal mythology of decent
housing; and if the legislatures have meant what they have said, let
them get busy and implement their principles.
This is hardly a revolutionary suggestion; the development of
civil rights law during the last dozen years has illustrated precisely
the type of judicial attitude required to implement the proposals put
forth in this article. The Supreme Court in effect said to Congress:
You put the idea of equality among the races in the law and we are
going to recognize it; it may be that to enforce our orders you will
have to call out troops, but, by George, we are telling you to put up
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or back down. This is judicial integrity, and it is exactly what is
needed now in the housing area.
It is time to recognize as a general principle what has so often
been made clear in specific instances: Because the courts are the
branch of government least responsive to immediate pressures, they
have the greatest flexibility and opp.ortunity, and thereby the greatest
responsibility, to safeguard and vindicate the legitimate rights of
minorities. Certainly the United States Supreme Court has recognized this, although it has put its assertion of equality as a branch
of government-its activism-under the constitutional cloak. To rely
upon the Constitution may have been perfectly sensible as a matter
of judicial politics, but no one could for a minute believe that the
Court in many civil rights, criminal procedure, or loyal-security cases
did only what the Constitution or the statutes compelled it to do. It
did, within the limits of the law, what those sources permitted it to
do. And it was justified in so acting because no other branch of
government could reasonably have been expected to provide the
needed leadership. Judicial leadership is needed once again.

